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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last thirty years, women have made significant progress
towards gender equity in traditionally male dominated fields.' Few
fields have witnessed as great an increase in opportunities for women
to participate and to succeed as athletics. For example, the 1999
Women's World Cup of Soccer generated unprecedented American
enthusiasm and support for women's athletics. 2  American women
athletes also participated in unprecedented numbers at the 1996
Summer Olympic Games in Atlanta.3 In addition, the nation's
1. Remarks on Signing a Memorandum Strengthening Enforcement of Tide IX, 33 PUlB.
PAPERS 894, 895 (1997). President Clinton paid homage to the advancement of women since
the passage of Tide IX in 1972. Id. He noted statistics that showed that women have increased
their percentage share of medical and law degrees issued from 9 to 38%, and from 7 to 43%,
respectively. Id. at 895.
2. See Grahame L.Jones, America the Bootiful LA TIMES, July 11, 1999, at DI (reporting
that 90,185 people attended the Women's World Cup final, the largest crowd forever a women's
sporting event).
3. See Charles Spitz, Note, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics as Mandated by Title IX of
the Education Amendments Act of 1972: Fair orFoul?, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 621, 648-49 (1997)
(observing that American women made up 42.9% of the 1996 U.S. Olympic Team, the largest
representation rate ever); Christine Brennan, U.S. Women Look Good in Gold, WASH. POST, Aug.
5, 1996, at C5 (noting that U.S. women athletes won 38 of the 101 Olympic medals won by all
U.S. athletes). In addition to winning 38 of the U.S. Olympic Team's 44 gold medals, women
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enthusiasm for women's college basketball is stronger than ever,'
generating the birth of two professional women's basketball leagues.'
Women athletes now compete in significant numbers in traditionally
male-only sports,6 and have even gained national recognition through
numerous marketing campaigns historically offered only to male
athletes.
7
Many authorities argue that the enactment of Tide IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 ("Tide IX)' caused the growth of
opportunities for women athletes.9 Undoubtedly, the passage of Tide
athletes were involved in some of the most memorable moments of the 1996 Summer Olympic
Games. See id. (noting the performances of the U.S. Women's Basketball Team and Amy Van
Dyken's four gold medals in swimming).
4. See Karen Dillon, Women's Coaches Finish Second, KAN. CITY STAR, Oct. 9, 1997, at A21
(noting that tickets to the 1997 women's Final Four sold out-a year in advance-in less than a
day);Jill R. Dorson, All Aboardfor 1998, The Post-Olympic Women's Athletic Boom Continues to Gather
Steam, DEN. POST, Dec. 30, 1997, at D10 (noting that the attendance at women's college
basketball games rose from 1 million in 1982 to 4.2 million in 1996, and that 15 million women
and girls participate in organized basketball).
5. In 1996, the American Basketball League ("ABL) began its first season of competition,
while a second women's professional basketball association, the Women's National Basketball
Association ("WNBA"), began competition in the summer of 1996. See Backers See Bright Future
for Women's Athletics, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Apr. 30, 1997, at A16 (noting the sudden rise of
women's professional basketball through the creation of the WNBA and the ABL). However, in
December 1998, the ABL disbanded its teams, citing financial difficulties. See Earl Gustkey,
Women's League is Calling it Quits, LA. TMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at D1 (reporting that lack of
attendance, competition with the WNBA for players, and inadequate television coverage were
key factors in the ABL closing down).
6. See MatthewJ. McPhillips, "Girls of Summer": A Comprehensive Analysis of the Past, Present,
and Future of Women in Baseball and a Roadmap to Litigating a Successful Gender Discrimination Case,
6 SETrON HALLJ. SPORT L. 301, 302 (1996) (noting the emergence of a professional women's
baseball team, the Colorado Silver Bullets); Ashley H. Grant, Another League of Their Own,
MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, Dec. 23, 1998, at 2 (reporting the formation of the Women's
Professional Football League); Dave McKibben, Sport Rings True for Carillo Boxing LA TIMES,
May 31, 1998, at C17 (observing women's professional boxing as an emerging sport with
dedicated participants).
7. See Marco Commisso, The New MVPs, S. FLA. Bus.J., May 8, 1998, at IA (reporting that
marketing companies have recently realized the potential of women athletes to promote
advertisers' products); Cyndee Miller, Marketers Look to Score with Women's Sports, MARKETING
NEvS, Aug. 4, 1997, at 1 (noting WNBA basketball star Sheryl Swoops' endorsement contract
with Nike shoes). Various television advertisements featuring female athletes have become
quite popular recently. For example, recent commercials featuring Cammi Granato of the U.S.
Women's Ice Hockey Team, Mia Hamn of the U.S. Women's Soccer Team, Olympic Gold-
Medal skier Picabo Street, professional beach-volleyball player Gabrielle Reece, and numerous
stars of the WNBA have helped create female athletes as cultural icons in much the same way as
the marketing of male athletes. See, e.g., Suzanne Bultmeyer, Playing to Women, SPORTING GOODS
BuS., June 1, 1994, at 70 (finding that sporting goods companies have discovered that using
female athletes to promote their products can be very effective); Mark Tedeschi, Super Models,
FOOTwEAR NEWS, July 10, 1995, at 14S (observing the rise of female athletes as product
spokespeople).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-907, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681-1688 (1994) [hereinafter Title IX]).
9. Following the 1996 Summer Olympics, President Clinton invited members of the U.S.
Olympic Team to the White House, where he stated that "[o]ver 20 years ago, in a complete,
bipartisan commitment here in Washington, the United States Congress passed something
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IX played a key role in the expansion of athletic opportunities for
women athletes. The number of women athletes in high school and
college athletic programs has increased dramatically since the
enactment of Title IX."' In fact, today, women athletes garner the
majority of new athletic opportunities in intercollegiate athletics."
Yet, Title IX is mistakenly viewed by these authorities and the public
as either the primary cause of the improvement of conditions for
female athletes, 2 or the sole catalyst for their success as athletes.1
Despite the positive effects for women athletes produced by Title
IX, the Act has also created severe "unintended consequences."'
Increasingly, due to shrinking university budgets, university
administrators are demanding that athletic directors reduce their
called Title IX, which made it possible for a lot of the women athletes to be here today."
Warren P. Strobel, Clinton Fetes Olympians at White House, Credits Title IXfor Women's Finish, WASH.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1996, atA4.
10. See Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ., Training and Life-long Learning of the House Comm. on Economic
and Educ. Opportunities, 104th Cong., 353 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (opening statement of
Mr. Williams of Montana) (noting that participation rates for female athletes rose from 2% of
the nation's college athletes prior to the enactment of Tide IX to 35% in 1995). The number
of female athletes in high school also rose from 300,000 to over 2 million. Id. See also Brian L.
Porto, Completing the Revolution: Title IX as Catalyst for an Alternative Model of College Sports, 8
SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 351, 352 (1998) (noting that 1 in 27 women students participated in
athletics in 1972, while 1 in 3 women students participated in athletics in 1996).
11. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERcOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: COMPARISON OF
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF MEN'S AND WOMEN'S PROGRAMS (GAO/HEHS-99-3R) 4 (1999)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (finding that women's student participation in National Collegiate
Athletic Conference ("NCAA") Division I athletic programs increased by 29% between 1984-85
and 1996-97, and 16% among all NCAA divisions). Mary C. Curtis & Christine H.B. Grant,
GenderEquity in Sports (last modifiedJune 29, 1999) <http://bailiwick.lib.uiowa.edu/ge/>. The
study reports that between the 1984-85 and 1994-95 academic years, women's athletic programs
within NCAA institutions gained over 32,000 participants, including a 5.1% increase between
1992-93 and the following year. Id. On the other hand, men's athletic programs experienced a
decline of nearly 2,000 participants. Id. While this decline is perhaps negligible, it is worth
noting that between 1984-85 and 1989-90, participation in men's athletic programs within the
NCAA dropped by almost 24,000 participants, a 12% decline. Id. During the same period,
women's athletic programs declined by only 2,000 participants, a 2% decline. Id.
12. See David Aronberg, Crumbling Foundations: Why Recent Judicial and Legislative Challenges
to Title IX May SignalIts Demis, 47 FLA. L. REV. 741, 767 n.184 (1995) (arguing that in addition
to Title IX, societal attitudes toward women increased subsidies for women's sports by the
NCAA and, the introduction of championships in women's sports by NCAA in order to
compete with the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women ("AJAW") for member
institutions, led to the increase in opportunities for women athletes).
13. See Barry Flynn, Players, Not Title IX Won World Cup available at
<http://wv.academia.org> (disputing the contention that the U.S. Women's Soccer Team's
1999 World Cup victory would not have been possible without Tide IX).
14. See Hearing, supra note 10, at 10 (statement of Rep. J. Dennis Hastert) (arguing that
Title IX has produced "unintended consequences"). However, in her statement,
Representative Cardiss Collins noted that when she chaired the House Subcommittee on
Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness, no "unintended consequences" were
found. Id. at 22-23.
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athletic budgets."5 Meanwhile, both the courts and the Department
of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"), which enforces Title
IX, has demanded that institutions increase the proportion of athletic
opportunities for female athletes to comply with the regulations
implementing Title IX.1 6 Due to these conflicting mandates to cut
athletic program expenditures while expanding athletic programs for
women, athletic directors have chosen the only viable mechanism to
achieve both requirements-eliminating men's athletic programs
and opportunities, particularly in nonrevenue-producing sports.7
Thus, in attempting to provide equal athletic opportunities for
women athletes, Title IX has instead created a battle for scarce
resources between male and female athletes, and between revenue
and nonrevenue-producing sports." This fight has led to distrust and
closed communications between partisan groups seeking to further
the interests of their members. 9
15. See Charles P. Beveridge, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's
Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 809, 810 (1996) (arguing that campus-wide cost cutting has
led many universities to cut their athletic budgets).
16. See Hearing, supra note 10, at 101 (statement of DavidJ.Jorns, Ph.D., President, Eastern
Illinois University) (testifying that OCR sent a settlement agreement, indicating that Eastern
Illinois University must add four additional women's sports following an OCR compliance
review). Two of the sports ordered to be added, women's gymnastics and field hockey, did not
have a demonstrated pool of interested and able athletes from which the university could field
teams. Id.
17. See INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S FORUM, MEN'S LossEs IN COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (listing a
total of 342 NCAA men's athletic programs, in 18 different categories, that have been cut as a
result of Tide IX between 1992 and 1997); Curtis & Grant, supra note 11 (observing the number
and kind of athletic activities educational institutions have removed and added). The vast
majority of men's teams that have been cut are nonrevenue-producing sports, such as baseball,
wrestling, diving, swimming, water polo, crew, and gymnastics. See, e.g., Michael D. Clark, Men's
Teams at Miami Face Gender Gap Ax, CINCINNATI ENQ., Apr. 14, 1998, at 3A (describing the
elimination of the University of Miami of Ohio's men's wrestling and outdoor track teams);
Mike Decourcy, UC Will Cut 3 Men's Sports; Women's Programs Adjusted For Equity, CINCINNATI
ENQ., May 7, 1998, at Al (describing the elimination of the University of Cincinnati's men's
tennis, rifle, and indoor track teams); Randy McNutt, Miami (Ohio) Eliminates Three Men's
Programs, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Apr. 16, 1999 (available at 1999 WL 6966029) (reporting that
Miami University of Ohio decided to eliminate its men's wrestling, soccer, and tennis teams to
comply with Title IX); Peter Monaghan, Providence College to Cut 3 Men's Sports Teams to Comply
Writh Title IX CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 9, 1998, at A4 (describing the removal of men's
baseball, golf, and tennis teams); Eric Noland, Nothing Easy For CSUN: Athletic Department Faces
Tough Choices, LA. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 25, 1997, at S1 (noting that California State University
Northridge cut men's baseball, soccer, volleyball, and swimming teams in June 1997); Northern
Arizona Drops Men's Swimming Diving ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 8, 1999, at C2 (stating that Northern
Arizona University elected to disband its men's swimming and diving programs to help achieve
Title IX compliance); Ryan White, PSU Closes Door on Baseball, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 30,
1998, at CI (describing the elimination of the Portland State University men's baseball team).
18. SeeJohn C. Weistart, Can Gender Equity Find a Place in Commercialized College Sports?, 3
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 191, 194-95 (1996) (arguing that under the current Title IX
enforcement mechanism, a "we/they," "men vs. women" dichotomy is created because athletic
funding is limited and a gender-based argument about the allocation of funds inevitably arises).
19. See, e.g., Bernie Miklasz, Title IX Twenty-Five Years Later, Posturing and Defensiveness
Continue to Make the Dialogue Difficul, HOUS. CHRON., June 22, 1997, at 8 (arguing against the
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Much of the blame lies with the OCR Policy Interpretation 20 of
Title IX regulations. As it has been applied, the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test for Title IX compliance forces
institutions, inter alia, to distribute athletic opportunities among
members of both sexes based upon each sex's proportion within the
student body. This requirement, known as substantial
proportionality, runs counter to Congress' intent in passing Title IX.
21
This is true for three reasons. First, Congress clearly disapproved of
using statistical balancing, quotas, and reverse discrimination in
order to prohibit sex discrimination against women in educational
institutions.22 Second, the implicit definition of gender equity
contained in the Policy Interpretation is an inaccurate gauge of an
institution's compliance with Title IX. Under this definition, equality
of opportunity is determined by comparing the proportion of athletic
opportunities provided to each sex, to each sex's proportion within
the student body.2s However, the substantial proportionality
requirement incorrectly determines Title IX compliance because
each sex's proportion within the student body is a much larger pool
of applicants than the qualified applicant pool-those students from
each sex with the interest and ability to compete in intercollegiate
athletics.24 Third, OCR and the courts' decision to treat revenue-
producing sports similar to nonrevenue-producing sports is contrary
narrow interpretation of the progress of opportunities for women athletes following the release
of the NCAA 5-year Gender Equity Study ("NCAA Study") by supporters of women's athletics).
The NCAA Study's interpretation argues that, although women's participation in athletics has
increased, the spending disparity between men's and women's teams overshadows any progress
that had been made. See NCAA Gender-Equity Task Force, Final Report (July 26, 1993). Mr.
Miklasz argues that this position severely misinterprets the progress that female athletes have
made over the last twenty-five years. Id. at 8.
20. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-23 (1979) (setting forth the factors to be examined in determining
an institution's compliance with Title IX).
21. See infra Part II (arguing Congress expressly disapproved quotas).
22. See infra Part HIA (arguing against the primacy of the "substantial proportionality"
prong under the Policy Interpretation's three-part test). See also Aronberg, supra note 12, at
747-51 (detailing the legislative history of Title IX's enactment and the clear Congressional
intent that quotas and statistical balancing should not be used to enforce Title IX); Donald C.
Mahoney, Taking a Shot at the Title: A Critical Review ofjudicial and Administrative Interpretations of
Title IX as Applied to Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 27 CONN. L. REV. 943, 945 (1995) (arguing
that Title IX's legislative history is unambiguously against using quotas to remedy past
discrimination).
23. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (1979) (compliance may also be assessed on the basis of under
representation, an institution's historical record of improving opportunities, and availability of
intercollegiate competition).
24. SeeWalter B. Connolly,Jr. &Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX Gender
Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended GenderEquity Based on Student Body Ratios, 71 U.
DEr. MERcYL. REV. 845, 880-82 (1994) (noting that the three-part test uses irrelevant data to
assess Title IX compliance because the qualified pool of applicants is too large).
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to Tide IX's regulationsn which specifically mandate OCR to
consider the unique characteristics of each sport26 Accordingly, OCR
and the courts do not take into account the economic, social, and
administrative factors that affect university athletic departments'
selection of athletic offerings, including sponsoring revenue-
21producing sports.
This Comment examines the pursuit of gender equity in
intercollegiate athletics under Tide IX and its regulatory framework.
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that Congress should revise Tide
IX to protect male students from the unintended consequences of
Tide IX's enforcement, while continuing to provide female students
with a fair opportunity to participate in athletics. Part II describes the
formation and enactment of Tide IX and its regulatory framework.
In addition, Part II summarizes the federal courts' treatment of
private rights of action brought under Tide IX and critiques the
federal courts' adoption, and subsequent application, of the Policy
Interpretation as the legal standard of proof in Tide IX athletics
cases. Part I argues that OCR and the federal courts' application of
the Policy Interpretation's three-part test to determine Tide IX
compliance is improper because Congress explicitly rejected
statistical balancing to enforce Tide IX. Furthermore, the three-part
test cannot accurately determine whether discrimination has
occurred in the distribution of athletic opportunities because it
cannot account for significant differences between the sexes,
structural differences among various activities, and differences
among institutions with diverse, nondiscriminatory goals for their
25. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415-16 (1979) (limiting different treatment for revenue-producing
sports by permitting greater expenditures of revenue to operate competitive events). The
Policy Interpretation outlines several acceptable reasons that expenditures for revenue-
producing sports could be greater than expenditures for other athletic activities, including
managing greater crowd size, operating larger facilities, and the maintenance of these
competitive facilities. Id.
26. See id. (stating that unique aspects of particular sports may need to be accommodated
to a greater degree than other sports). Provided that disparate benefits are reflected equally in
men's and women's programs, OCR will determine the differences in particular program
components to be justifiable. Id. at 71,416. The Policy Interpretation recognizes that this
problem often arises within institutions offering football and that the disparate benefits often
favor men. Id. See also Phillip Anderson, A Football School's Guide to Title IX Compliance, 2 SPORTS
LJ. 75, 82-83 (1995) (noting that the Policy Interpretation provides two nondiscriminatory
justifications for disparate benefits for football: the unique aspects of the sport and the greater
financial cost of event management of football games).
27. See Matthew L. Daniel, Title X and Gender Equity in College Athetics: How Honesty Might
Avert a Ciisis, 95 ANN. S0Rv. AM. L. 255, 259 (1995) (arguing that Title IX litigation has wrongly
presumed that all college sports are intended to provide student athletes with educational
benefits). Certain college sports are not operated to provide an educational purpose, but
instead serve as a profit center for the university. Id.
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athletic programs. Finally, Part IV discusses possible solutions to the
inequitable application of Title IX to intercollegiate athletics.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORYAND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF
TITLE IX
Several legal authorities claim that the legislative history of Title IX
is ambiguous. Unfortunately, most authorities only briefly examine
Title IX's legislative history before reaching this conclusion."
Indeed, Tide IX's legislative history is fraught with confusion and
uncertainty, not only from the sparcity of legislative history, but also
the disjointed enactment of Title IX.s0 To overcome this confusion
and to determine Congress' intent, it is necessary to study the
enactment of Title IX and its subsequent application to
intercollegiate athletics.
A. The Enactment of Title IX and Its Application to Athletics
The genesis of Title IX can be found in a set of hearings chaired by
Representative Edith Green during the summer of 1970.31 During
these hearings, witnesses testified before the Special House
Subcommittee on Education that a significant number of sex
discrimination complaints involved educational institutions. 2 The
Subcommittee also received recommendations that new civil rights
protections should be enacted that apply to sex discrimination and
parallel Title VI of the Civil Rights Amendments'"" prohibition of
racial discrimination.34 The following year, Representative Green and
28. See Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1984) (holding that Title IX's
legislative history is ambiguous); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(finding that the legislative history of Title IX is ambiguous); Mahoney, supra note 22, at 945
(observing that few courts have examined the legislative history of Title Ix's application to
athletics, and concluding that the legislative history is "ambiguous").
29. See Haffer, 524 F. Supp. at 534 (conduding that the legislative history of Title IX is
ambiguous after finding little congressional debate of the 1972 Title IX bills). The Court came
to this conclusion after briefly summarizing the congressional debate of the 1971 Title IX
measures, which were nearly identical to the 1972 bills that became Title IX. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor on
§ 805 of H.R 16098,91st Cong. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings] (considering § 805 of
H.R. 16098, which would have included sex discrimination under Title VI's protections); see also
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 n.16 (1979) (detailing the sparse legislative
history of Title IX ); 118 CONG. REc. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (tracing the
beginnings of Title IX and the details of the 1970 House Hearings by Representative Green).
32. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16 (noting that the Subcommittee received testimony
identifying educational institutions as the primary source of Title IX complaints).
33. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 601-605, 78 Stat. 301
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1995)).
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Senator Bayh attempted to add these anti-discrimination principles to
the 1971 Education Amendment bills.35 Although Congress engaged
in substantial debate, neither bill was adopted. 6
In a renewed effort, Senator Bayh and Congresswoman Green
reintroduced the same bills in early 1972 as additions to the
Education Amendments of 1972.s Congress hardly debated either
bill's scope of application or intent before it enacted the Senate bill
in June 1972."8 However, because the bill that became Tide IX is
substantially identical to the 1971 Tide IX bills, 9 congressional
debate of the 1971 bills provides additional guidance in determining
legislative intent." From the debate of the 1971 bills and the limited
congressional debate of the 1972 bill, it is clear that Congress'
unstated purpose was to prohibit sexual discrimination by denying
federal funds to educational institutions in violating the law."
34. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 n.16 (observing the recommendations of the Justice
Department and the United States Commission on Civil Rights that a new provision be created
that would parallel Title VI, but would be more limited in its application).
35. See H.R 32, 92d Cong., Title IX (1971). Although H.R. 16098 was not enacted during
the 91st Congress, H.R. 32 took the earlier provisions and modified them as suggested by the
1970 House Hearings. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677, 696 n.16 (1979) (noting that the Bayh
Amendment adopted similar language to Title VI of the Civil Rights Amendment and only
added the word "sex" to the existing law); Aronberg, supra note 12, at 748 (arguing that the
1971 Bayh Amendment was similar to the adopted final Title IX amendment).
36. See 118 CONG. REc. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (recognizing that the 1971
version of the Title IX bill that Senator Bayh introduced was ruled "nongermane" to the 1971
Education Act Amendments).
37. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 278 (1972). See also S. 659, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REG. 2808
(1972).
38. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that the
legislative history indicates obvious Congressional approval of Title IX's scope and application).
39. See 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that the 1972 Title
IX bill introduced in the Senate adopted the key provisions of the 1971 bill).
40. See, e.g., Aronberg, supra note 12, at 747-51 (using the legislative history of both the
1971 and 1972 Title IX bills to reach the conclusion that Congress intended to prohibit the use
of quotas in implementing Tite IX); Christa D. Leahy, Note, The Title Bout: A Critical Review of
the Regulation and Enforcement of Title IX in Intercollegiate Athletics, 24 J.C. & U.L. 489, 529-32
(1998) (arguing that the legislative history of the 1971 and 1972 Title IX bills demonstrates that
Congress did not intend for Title IX to require quotas or affirmative action); Mahoney, supra
note 22, at 945-49 (supplementing Title IX's legislative history with the 1971 congressional
debates of the unenacted Title IX bills to argue that Congress did not intend for the Act to
require quotas).
41. See 117 CONG. REC. 30,403 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that women
seeking admission to universities are often held to a higher standard); 118 CONG. REc. 5804-07
(1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (detailing the unfair discrimination against women seeking
higher education); Andrew A. Ingrum, Civil Rights: Title IX and Collegiate Athletics: Is There a
Viable Compromise?, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 755, 757 (1995) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). "Athletics" was mentioned only twice during the Title IX debates
and only as an example of the limits of the legislation. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (arguing that Title IX will not require the desegregation of football or
men's locker rooms); 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (statement of Senator Bayh) (stating that
sports facilities will not be subject to Title IX in instances where personal privacy must be
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However, Congress never intended Title IX to require institutions to
take affirmative action to ensure the equal distribution of educational
opportunities.
1. The Tower andJavitz Amendments-Title IX Applied to Athletics
Following the enactment of Title IX in 1972, Congress charged
OCR, then part of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
("HEW"), 43 to issue regulations to implement Title IX.44  Prior to
publishing the proposed Title IX regulations for public comment,
HEW stated that the proposed regulations would include the
regulation of athletics. 45  HEW's assertion surprised many
Congressmen because athletics was only mentioned twice during the
Congressional debate of the 1971 and 1972 Title IX bills. 8 Moreover,
these sections of the Congressional debate did not directly address
the regulation of athletics, but instead concerned invasions of privacy
and integration of single-sex teams.47
In an effort to circumvent HEW's surprising assertion of regulatory
power, Congress devoted significant time during the debate of the
Education Amendments of 19748s to define Title IX's application to
preserved).
42. See, eg., 118 CONG. REc. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (asserting that the 1972
Senate version of the Title IX bill includes language from the best anti-discrimination bills that
Congress has introduced); 117 CONG. REC. 39,262 (1971) (statement of Rep. Quie) (submitting
an amendment to the 1971 House version of the Title IX bill that is similar to the prohibition
against the preferential treatment of minorities under the Civil Rights Act); id. (statement of
Rep. Green) (opposing the preferential treatment for women under the 1971 House version of
the Title IX bill, even in the attempt to end sex discrimination). For further discussion of Title
X's legislative intent, see infra Part IhiA.
43. At the time of the enactment of Title IX, OCR was part of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare ("HEW"). However, after Congress split HEW into the Department of
Education ("DED") and the Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"), OCR was
incorporated as part of the Department of Education. Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 101-511, 93 Stat.
669 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510); 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a) (1), (a)(3) (1995). Throughout
Title IX's existence, OCR has always administered its provisions, either as part of HEW or DED.
44. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994).
45. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 950 (describing OCR's initial attempts to regulate
athletics under Title IX between the enactment of the Education Act Amendments of 1972 and
1974); 120 CONG. REC. 15,323 (1974) (statement of John Tower) (recognizing that HEW,
OCR's parent agency, believed it had authority to promulgate regulations enforcing Title IX in
athletics).
46. See 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (1971) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (declaring that the
proposed Title IX bill would not require the integration of intercollegiate football or the
desegregation of men's locker rooms); 118 CONG. REc. 5807 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(stating that the Act would allow for segregation of facilities and differential treatment in cases
where it is absolutely essential for the benefit of the program or where personal privacy is
concerned, such as the treatment of locker rooms).
47. See 117 CONG. REC. 30,407 (1971).
48. Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 541 (1974).
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athletics.49 In particular, Congress considered two bills intended to
guide the application of the Title IX regulations to athletics. The
first bill, introduced by SenatorJohn Tower, was designed to exclude
revenue-producing sports from Title IX's scrutiny, provided that the
sport support itself in the absence of university funding.0 Senator
Tower stated that the amendment was necessary to preserve the
viability of these sports, as well as the entire athletic program.5 1 He
argued that altering the operating guidelines for revenue-producing
sports would lead to the erosion of the financial base for the entire
athletic program because revenue-producing sports often generate
sufficient revenue to fund additional sports within the athletic
program."2 Ironically, Senator Tower argued, similar treatment of
revenue and nonrevenue-generating sports under Title IX would
reduce the revenues needed for creating and elevating competitive
opportunities for women.5 Following minor modification, the Senate
agreed to the Tower Amendment, and sent the amendment to the
joint conference committee for further consideration. 4
49. When Congress learned of HEW's intention, intense debate occurred regarding
whether Title IX should apply to all sports or whether some sports should be excluded. See 120
CONG. REc. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (arguing that revenue-producing sports
should be excluded from the scope of Title IX's powers).
50. See 120 CONG. REc. 15,322 (1974) (proposing amendment 1343 to exclude
intercollegiate athletic programs from Title IX's application). The original version of the
Tower Amendment, reprinted on the same page of the Congressional Record, would have
completely excluded intercollegiate athletic programs from Title IX's application. Id. Senator
Tower argued that Title IX, as debated and enacted, was not intended to apply to athletic
programs. Id at 15,323. Senator Tower was also against allowing HEW to promulgate
regulations pertaining to athletics without Congressional authority. Id. Tower argued that only
if the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare reached a determination that legislation
is necessary, should Congress legislate in this area. ML
51. See 120 CONG. REC. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (arguing that the
impairment of the financial base of revenue-producing sports threatens the viability of the sport
and the athletic program itself). The Tower Amendment is often understood to apply only to
traditional revenue-producing sports such as football and basketball. See Porto, supra note 10, at
361 (mentioning only men's football and basketball as the typical revenue-producing sports).
However, Senator Tower actually argued for a more flexible standard that would take into
consideration the uniqueness of regional athletic markets. See 120 CONG. REC. 15,323 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Tower) (mentioning men's football and basketball as revenue-producing
sports, as well as other regional sports at particular institutions). For example, Senator Tower
argued that ice hockey may be covered under his amendment at certain universities where it
produces revenue. Id Likewise, women's basketball at select institutions may be exempted
from the application of Title IX if its gross receipts or donations could sustain the team. Met
52. See 120 CONG. REc. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (observing that
nonrevenue-producing sports often depend on the surplus revenue generated by revenue-
producing sports, and, therefore, a reduction in this surplus revenue would ultimately harm
nonrevenue-producing sports).
53. See i&. (recognizing that revenue-producing athletic activities mostly involve male
competitors, Sen. Tower argued that female athletes have just as great of a stake in the financial
base created by these activities, because the surplus revenue generated by these sports helps
fund women's athletics).
54. See id at 15,322-23 (containing two amendments to the original Tower Amendment).
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However, the Tower Amendment was abandoned during the
Senate-House Conference Committee.ss In its place, Congress
enacted a compromise bill, known as the Javitz Amendment." The
Javitz Amendment authorized HEW to "[implement] the provisions
of Tite IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 relating to the
prohibition of sex discrimination in federally assisted education
programs which shall include, with respect to intercollegiate athletic
activities, reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular
sports."
5 7
Title IX supporters generally interpret the rejection of the Tower
Amendment, and the subsequent enactment of the Javitz
Amendment, as evidence that Congress intended HEW to regulate
intercollegiate athletic activities in a uniform manner, with only
limited exceptions5s Additionally, these supporters argue that,
because Congress rejected the Tower Amendment, the Javitz
Amendment does not permit special considerations for the unique
nature of revenue-producing sports. 9 Yet, the Javitz Amendment's
explicit grant of power for HEW to regulate athletics indicates that
Congress intended for athletics to be regulated with greater care and
The first amendment limited the Tower Amendment's original scope of application by
excluding only those sports that were able to generate enough revenue to maintain the sport.
Id. at 15,322. The second amendment inserted a subsection granting HEW the power to
regulate athletics under the Tower Amendment. Id. at 15,323. However, Senator Tower stated
that the subsection did not provide HEW with greater regulatory authority than was already
conferred by Title IX. Id. Senator William Dodd Hathaway agreed with this statement, saying
that the second amendment was proposed to clarify OCR's authority to regulate the Tower
Amendment. Id.
55. SeeJodi Hudson, Comment, Complying with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
The Never-Ending Race to the Finish Line, 5 SETON HALLJ. SPORT L. 575, 578 (1995) (arguing that
Congress abandoned the Tower Amendment in favor of the Javitz Amendment, which better
reflected Congress' disapproval of exempting revenue-producing sports from Title IX
enforcement). Following the defeat of the Tower Amendment in the joint conference, several
attempts were made to prohibit the application of Title IX to revenue-producing sports and
athletics generally. See H.R. 8394, 94th Cong. (1975) (intending to protect revenues produced
by a team from use by any other team unless the producing team did not need the funds for
itself); S. 2106, 94th Cong. (1975) (intending to exempt revenue-producing sports from Title
IX).
56. Education Amendments of 1974 (Title VIII), Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 484
(1974) (codified at20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994)).
57. See id.
58. See Porto, supra note 10, at 361 (stating that the defeat of the Tower Amendment
meant that Title IX would apply to all college sports); Hudson, supra note 55, at 578 (arguing
that the enactment of the Javitz Amendment evidenced Congressional intent for revenue-
producing sports to be subject to Title IX enforcement).
59. See Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path of Most Resistance: The Long Road Toward
GenderEquity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DKEJ. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 51, 54-55 (1996) (asserting
that Congress intended for Title IX to apply similarly to revenue and nonrevenue-producing
sports, while recognizing that certain sports may require greater expenditures to provide
equivalent competitive opportunities).
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consideration than the regulation of other educational programs.
Under the Education Amendments of 1972, Congress had already
authorized HEW to promulgate regulations implementing Title IX
generally, subject only to Constitutional limitations." Because the
Javitz Amendment contains additional explicit limitations to HEW's
previously unrestricted authority to regulate athletics under Title IX,
Congress may have intended the Javitz Amendment to instruct HEW
to regulate athletics with a higher standard of care than other Title
IX issues." Yet, Title IX regulations affecting intercollegiate athletics
exhibit little flexibility or understanding of athletics and athletic
62
programs.
B. Regulatory Framework of Title lX Enforcement
OCR published its proposed Title IX regulations on June 20,
1974.6 While only two sections of the proposed regulations
pertained to athletics, the majority of the public comments OCR
received addressed these sections. 4 Despite the significant concern
demonstrated by these comments, OCR eliminated only two
subsections from the proposed sections regulating athletics prior to
issuing the final Title IX regulations. 65
60. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (charging each federal agency empowered to provide
federal financial assistance to any educational institution with the authority to issue regulations
consistent with Title IX in order to achieve the Act's objectives).
61. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 950 (stating that Congress' grant of regulatory authority
to HEW to regulate athletics was duplicative because HEW already had broad regulatory
authority to promulgate Title IX regulations from the 1972 Education Act Amendments).
Accordingly, because HEW already had broad authority to regulate Title IX, the inference that
should be drawn from the limiting text of the Javitz Amendment is that Congress intended
HEW to use care when regulating athletics. Id See also Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics
and Title IX 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 34, 36 (1977) (arguing that Congress intended that HEW
regulate athletics with particular care).
62. See infra Part IH.C (discussing Titie IX's regulatory structure's inability to fairly address
the various differences among athletic activities and institutions).
63. See generally 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228-40 (1974) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86 (1997)).
Following the division of HEW into HHS and DED in 1980, OCR adopted an identical set of
Title IX regulations when it became part of DED, while keeping in place the Title IX
regulations issued by HEW. 45 Fed. Reg. 30,803, 30,960-62 (1980) (codified at 34 G.F.R. pt. 106
(1997)). See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (calling the duplicate
Titie IX regulations a "wonderful example of bureaucratic muddle," noting that each set of
regulations is "identical, save only for changes in nomenclature reflecting the reorganization of
the federal bureaucracy"). For the sake of simplicity, further discussion of the Title IX
regulations will cite the DED regulations instead of the HEW regulations.
64. See Sex Discrimination Regulations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Educ. of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 94th Cong. 7 (1975) (reporting that the majority of comments
received by HEW addressed the impact of the regulations upon intercollegiate athletics);
Mahoney, supra note 22, at 950 (noting that HEW received 9,700 comments during the
comment period, the majority of which concerned athletics).
65. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,132 (1975) (deleting the "Determination of Student Interest" and
the "Affirmative Efforts" subsections of the proposed Title IX regulations); id- at 24,134 (noting
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The first eliminated subsection, entitled the "Determination of
Student Interest,"6 required educational institutions to determine
the athletic activities each sex preferred.67  Many institutions
interpreted this subsection to require an annual polling of student
interest. The institution would then sponsor or eliminate athletic
activities based upon the findings of the poll.' OCR, on the other
hand, stated that the Determination of Student Interest subsection
was merely intended to require institutions to consider the interests
of both sexes in determining what sports to offer. 9 To avoid criticism
that an annual poll would unfairly interfere with an institution's
selection of its athletic offerings, OCR eliminated the Determination
of Student Interest subsection and inserted a new subsection that
required institutions to select "sports and levels of competition which
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of
both sexes."70
The second proposed, and subsequently eliminated subsection,
entitled "Affirmative Efforts," 71  required institutions to "make
affirmative efforts to inform students" of the previously
underrepresented sex "of the availability of equal opportunities for
them, and to provide support and training to enable them to
participate in those opportunities."72 Many institutions interpreted
this subsection to require affirmative steps to promote gender equity,
and, therefore, conflicted with § 106.3 of the regulations, which limits
the circumstances where OCR can require institutions to take
that institutions voiced concern that the eliminated subsections would require an annual
polling of student interest and affirmative action in providing athletic opportunities for
women). In addition to deleting these two subsections, HEW added new provisions to the
regulations, such as the so-called "laundry-list" of 10 non-exclusive factors to consider when
evaluating "equal athletic opportunity." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1997). Yet, this additional text
did not substantively alter the remaining athletic regulations. See also Mahoney, supra note 22,
at 950-52 (discussing the deletion of the two subsections and the addition of the "laundry list" of
factors); infra note 80 (listing the factors contained in the "laundry list").
66. See39 Fed. Reg. 22,228, 22,236 (1974).
67. See ida at 22,230 (stating that recipients of federal funds must determine, under the
"determination of student interest" subsection, what athletic activities students of each sex wish
to undertake).
68. See 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
69. See id.
70. See id. (noting the replacement of the determination of student interest subsection and
issuing the final regulations stating that institutions use a reasonable method that the
institutions deem appropriate for considering the interests of both sexes); 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.41 (c) (i) (replacing the determination of student interest subsection). While eliminating
the determination of student interest subsection, in issuing the final regulations, HEW stated
that institutions should use a reasonable method that the institutions deem appropriate to
consider the interests of both sexes. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,134 (1975).
71. 39 Fed. Reg. 22,228,22,236 (1974).
72. See id. at 22,230.
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affirmative action.73 As a result, OCR eliminated this subsection to
avoid confusion regarding when institutions would be required to
take affirmative action.4
Absent these two subsections, OCR's final regulations impose three
requirements upon athletic programs subject to Title IX.75 First, the
regulations require that "[n]o person shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participating in, denied the benefits of, be treated
differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated
against" in virtually any athletic program offered by the institution.76
Second, while the regulations do not require institutions to establish
separate sports teams for each sex in order to comply with the Act, it
strictly limits the circumstances where an institution may offer an
athletic activity for only one sex.77 Under the regulations, institutions
may offer an athletic activity for only one sex if participants are
chosen by competitive skill or if the activity is a contact sport78
However, if institutions offer a non-contact sport to only one sex, it
must allow members of the other sex to try-out for the team.79 Third,
the regulations provide institutions with a laundry list of criteria that
OCR will examine to determine whether equal athletic opportunity is
available.s0
73. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, 24,134 (1975). See also 34 C.F.R. § 106.3 (1997) (limiting the
criteria for requiring educational institutions to utilize affirmative action). 34 C.F.R. § 106.3(a)
requires institutions to take affirmative action when OCR finds that an institution receiving
federal funds has engaged in sex discrimination. Id. The institution would be required to take
affirmative steps to overcome this determination. Id However, where an institution has not
been found to engage in sex discrimination, that institution may engage in affirmative action if
it so chooses, under § 106.3(a), to overcome the effects of conditions that have limited the
participation of the underrepresented sex. See id, § 106.3(b).
74. See4O Fed. Reg. 24,128, 24,134 (1975).
75. See34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (a)-(c) (1997).
76. See iU, § 106.41 (b). The regulation applies to "any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club
or intramural athletics offered by the recipient" institution. Id
77. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1997) (detailing the circumstances where institutions may
offer a sport for only one sex, notwithstanding the broad requirements of § 106.41 (a)).
78. See id According to the regulations, "contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby,
ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major activity of which involves
bodily contact." Id. One federal judge has argued that, because contact sports may be limited
to participants from only one sex, their participants should not be included in a numeric
comparison of athletic opportunities provided by the institution. But see Cohen v. Brown Univ.,
101 F.3d 155, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that because contact
sports may be limited to participants from only one sex, their participants should be included in
numeric comparison of athletic opportunities provided by the institution).
79. Seeid.
80. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1997). The regulations provide a non-exclusive list of 10
factors to be considered by the director. These are:
(i) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(ii) The provision of equipment and supplies;
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Although women's athletic programs steadily expanded following
the publication of the final regulations,1 many institutions were
concerned that their athletic programs would not comply with Title
IX 2 once the adjustment period set by the regulations had expired."5
To address these concerns, in 1979 OCR issued a Policy
Interpretation4 to clarify the enforcement of three issues affecting
athletic programs: scholarships; equivalence in "other athletic
benefits and opportunities," which describes the enforcement of the
so-called "laundry list" factors; and the effective accommodation of
student interests and abilities.s
The Policy Interpretation has been generally criticized by
numerous parties.6 It was issued without approval from Congress,
the President, or OCR, 7 but has nonetheless become the key
(iii) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(iv) Travel and per diem allowance;
(v) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(vi) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(vii) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(viii) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(ix) Provision of housing and dining facilities;
(x) Publicity.
Id.
In addition, although OCR shall consider whether the institution failed to provide
necessary funds for teams of each sex in determining Title IX compliance, "unequal aggregate
expenditures for members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams...
will not constitute noncompliance." Id.
81. SeeJoanie M. Schrof, A Sporting Chance?, U.S. Navs & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 1994, at 51,
52 (reporting that the proportion of women participating in NCAA intercollegiate athletics
programs increased from 7% in 1972 to nearly 33% in 1979).
82. SeeJill K. Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation
of the Standards of Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 558 (1994) (stating that institutions
complained that the regulations were vague and inadequate, prompting the need for
clarification); Melody Harris, Hitting Em Where it Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to Bring Gender
Equity to Athletics, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 60 (1994) (noting that institutions demanded a
clarification of the Act's vague requirements because violation called for the removal of federal
funds from the violating institution).
83. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d) (1997) (giving athletic programs at elementary schools until
1976, and until 1978 for secondary and post-secondary institutions, to comply with Title IX).
84. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,413-23 (1979).
85. See id. The intent of the Policy Interpretation was to clarify the meaning of "equal
opportunity" consistent with the Act and the regulations. Id. at 71,414.
86. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 745-58, 782-88 (calling the Policy Interpretation "the
most powerful and controversial guidepost in the Title IX regulatory morass"); Mark
Hammond, Substantial Proportionality Not Required. Achieving Title IX Compliance Without Reducing
Participation in Collegiate Athletics, 87 KY. LJ. 793 (calling the policy interpretation "the
cornerstone of a substantial portion of Title IX litigation"); Harris, supra note 82, at 61 (stating
that the policy interpretation is the "definitive, published interpretation of the agency charged
with implementing Title IX").
87. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993) (failing to find any record
that OCR formally adopted the Policy Interpretation). The Policy Interpretation was issued just
months before the HEW split, and was subsequently adopted by OCR. SeeAronberg, supra note
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regulatory provision for Title IX compliance."s The Policy
Interpretation is particularly criticized for the test to determine
compliance with the effective accommodation of student interests
and abilities requirement.89 Commonly known as the "Three-Part
Test,"'* it was intended to determine Title IX compliance during
OCR reviews" and to provide institutions with a way to evaluate their
own compliance efforts However, the "three-part test," as it is
commonly used, is a misnomer. It actually consists of two tests: the
three-part test itself, consisting of three independent prongs, and the
"levels of competition" test.9 3 But, because failure of the three-part
test precludes the application of the levels of competition test, the
three-part test dominates the nomenclature.
According to the Policy Interpretation, institutions must meet at
least one prong of the three-part test to comply with Title IX.14 The
first prong, known as the "Substantial Proportionality" requirement,
states that institutions comply with Title IX if they provide athletic
participation opportunities for male and female students substantially
proportionate to each gender's respective enrollment. 5  Both
supporters and critics of Title IX agree that this prong ultimately
requires gender equity in athletic programs premised upon
proportionate balancing of athletic opportunities. 6 However, critics
12, at 754 (arguing that OCR adopted the HEW Policy Interpretation "as a matter of course,
without engaging in any formal process for adopting the document").
88. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 524 (observing that the federal courts have given the Policy
Interpretation substantial deference).
89. See; e.g., Hearing supra note 10, at 78 (statement of Vartan Gregorian, President, Brown
University) (declaring his outrage that Brown's "Model for the Nation" women's athletic
program could not satisfy any of the three prongs of the three-part test); Connolly, Jr. &
Adelman, supra note 24, at 880-82 (arguing that the three-part test is invalid because it uses
irrelevant data, the proportion of each sex within the student body, to measure an institution's
efforts to provide equal athletic opportunities for members of each sex); Jeffrey P. Ferrier,
Comment, Title IX Leaves Some Athletes Asking "Can We Play Too2,"44 CATH. U. L. REV. 841, 865-
870 (1995) (analyzing the unfeasibility of the three-part test).
90. See Hearing, supra note 10, at 36 (statement of Norma Cantu, Secretary of the Office of
Civil Rights, DED) (stating that her testimony will focus on the "three-part test").
91. See Hearing, supra note 10, at 36 (acknowledging that OCR uses the three-part test to
determine Title IX compliance).
92. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,414 (1979) (noting that the Policy Interpretation may be
used for guidance by administrators of athletic programs and to provide guidance in
determining whether any disparities between men's and women's athletic programs are
"justifiable and nondiscriminatory").
93. I& at 71,418. The accommodation of interests test determines whether the athletic
interests of each gender have been equally met.
94. See id. (stating that compliance will be assessed in any one of the three ways contained
in the three-part test).
95. See id
96. See Loretta M. Lamar, To Be an Equitist or Not: A View of Title IX 1 SPORTS LJ. 237, 271
(1994) (noting that Washington State University has achieved gender equity under the three-
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of Tide IX argue that this prong essentially requires institutions to
implement a quota roughly equal to the proportion of women
students at the institution.97 Moreover, although OCR provides an
example of substantial proportionality," most institutions remain
uncertain whether its athletic program satisfies this prong. The
reason for this uncertainty is that the Policy Interpretation does not
define "substantially proportionate," even though it is the primary
test for Tide IX compliance."°°
The second prong of the three-part test, the "Program Expansion"
requirement, states that institutions comply with Tide IX if they
demonstrate a "history and continuing practice" of expanding
athletic activities for women athletes.0'0 Unfortunately, the program
expansion prong also does not define either "historic" or "continuing
expansion." 2 In addition, the Policy Interpretation does not provide
an example of a hypothetical program that satisfies the program
expansion prong.'03 Accordingly, the program expansion prong
part test by being "within one percent" of the male to female student body ratio); Leahy, supra
note 40, at 497 (citing the rationale of the court in Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st
Cir. 1993), that the substantial proportionality prong is a "safe harbor" because statistical parity
is viewed as equivalent to equal opportunity).
97. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 528 (arguing that the "substantial proportionality" prong's
requirement that the proportion of women athletes must be substantially proportional to the
proportion of women within the student body is equivalent to imposing employment quotas
upon employers based on aggregate population statistics); Eugene G. Bernardo II, Note and
Comment, Unsportsanlike Conduct: Title IX and Cohen v. Brown University, 2 ROGER 'WILLIAMS
L. REV. 305, 341 (1997) (arguing that the Cohen court's interpretation of the Policy
Interpretation "transforms Tide IX into an affirmative action, quota based scheme").
98. See DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, CLARIFICATION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PoLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (DRAFr) (1995)
[hereinafter CLARIFICATION] (providing several examples of hypothetical institutions that satisfy
substantial proportionality).
99. SeeAronberg, supra note 12, at 761-62 (reporting that university administrators in 1995
were so concerned that their athletic programs did not comply with the vague standards set by
OCI, that Representatives Howard "Buck" McKeon and Steve Gunderson directed OCR to
provide more specific rules for compliance, or be subject to Congressional intervention). In
response to this demand, OCR issued its Clarification inJanuary 1996. Id. at 763. However, the
Clarification did little more than reinforce the vague standards under which OCR conducted
Tide IX compliance reviews. Id. at 763.
100. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 497 (stating that no standard exists for what distribution of
athletic opportunities satisfies "substantial proportionality").
101. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979) (emphasis added). The program expansion must
also be responsive to the developing interests and abilities of the members of the
underrepresented sex. Id.
102. See id. However, while the Policy Interpretation does not define either of these terms,
several courts have interpreted them to mean a longstanding and perpetual expansion of
athletic opportunities for women athletes. See also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (Ist
Cir. 1993) (interpreting the second prong to require a continual expansion of athletic
opportunities for women athletes).
103. See44 Fed. Reg. 71,413,71,418 (1979). OCR finally provided examples of hypothetical
athletic programs that would comply with the second prong in its Clarification in 1996.
CLARIFICATION, supra note 98, at 8.
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alone cannot effectively guide OCR investigators and educational
institutions in determining Title IX compliance by empirical
standards.
0 4
The third prong, or the "Accommodation of Interest" requirement,
states that institutions comply with Title IX once they have "fully and
effectively accommodated" the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex. 05 The Policy Interpretation implicitly suggests
that the third prong may be used to demonstrate Title IX compliance
after an institution fails to meet the first or second prong of the
three-part test.l' Thus, the third prong's scope of protection from
Title IX liability includes institutions which have not met the
substantial proportionality or program expansion prongs, but have
nevertheless accommodated the full interests and abilities of the
underrepresented sex.'O
Although the Policy Interpretation was intended to clarify the
existing regulations and provide guidance to institutions that were
uncertain whether their athletic programs complied with the Act, it
failed miserably.' The Policy Interpretation failed to adequately
address several of the most challenging problems facing the
application of Title IX to athletics."° In fact, inherent enforcement
104. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 498 (arguing that the second prong is ambiguous);
Aronberg, supra note 12, at 785 (noting that the uncertainty of meeting the second prong of
the three-part test-no school had yet met the benchmark in any Title IX case-contradicted
the claim that the three-part test is a flexible standard). Although nearly all defendant
institutions have been unable to meet the program expansion prong, at least one institution was
able to satisfy it. See Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., 1998 WL 167296 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998)
(holding that Syracuse University demonstrated a historic and continual program expansion of
women's athletic opportunities, despite failing to add any women's sports between 1982 and
1995).
105. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (1979).
106. SeeVALEm M. BONNETrE & LAMAR DANiEL, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUc., TITLE IX ATHLETICS
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 24-25 (1990) (explaining the process for determining Title IX
compliance under an OCR compliance review). The Investigator's Manual instructs OCR
personnel to only proceed to a subsequent prong of the three-part test if they have determined
that the institution has not satisfied the previous prong. IL Thus, the third prong is only
applied if the institution has failed to meet the previous two prongs.
107. See Darryl C. Wilson, Parity Bowl 1X. Barrier Breakers v. Common Sense Makers The Serpentine
Struggle for Gender Diversity in Collegiate Athletics, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 397, 432 (1996-1997) (noting
that institutions may still comply with Title IX if the disproportionate athletic opportunities for
women athletes fully and effectively accommodate their interests and abilities).
108. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 754-58 (criticizing the impossibility of meeting the
three-part test due to the inability to reach the required proportion of female participation);
Leahy, supra note 40, at 529-30 (arguing that the Policy Interpretation requires institutions to
implement an affirmative action plan, contrary to the legislative history of the Act).
109. See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,419-423 (1979) (noting the problematic issues raised through
public comments). In the appendices to the Policy Interpretation, OCR included findings of
the historical patterns of intercollegiate development, as well as comments received from the
public. Id. at 71,419. OCR reported several key concerns voiced by commentors, such as the
treatment of football and other revenue-producing sports, the treatment of the rights of
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problems overlooked by the Policy Interpretation have produced
harmful results for athletic programs. 10 This occurred following the
federal courts' adoption of the Policy Interpretation as the legal
framework for determining liability in Title IX lawsuits.
C. Legal Application of Title IX-The Birth, Death, Rebirth, and
Supercharging of the Act
Originally, Tide IX was enacted as a public remedy statute granting
federal agencies the authority to withdraw federal funds from
educational institutions violating the Act."' During this time,
institutions were insulated from the threat of outside litigation by
private individuals. 2 However, in 1979, the Supreme Court in
Cannon v. University of Chicagd's held that Title IX granted an implied
private right of action to individuals harmed by sex discrimination in
federally funded educational institutions. 4 Supporters of Title IX
celebrated Cannon for providing victims of sex discrimination with
the means to enforce their rights in the courtroom and for bolstering
the efforts of overburdened administrative agencies." 5
Following the Court's recognition of a private right of action in
Cannon, another debate regarding the scope of Title IX's protections
arose in the federal courts. Due to the sparse legislative history of
Tide IX, a question existed since its enactment regarding whether
Title IX compliance was specifically levied against individual
programs within the institution that received federal funds, or against
individuals; the difficulty of comparing the benefits and opportunities given to the programs of
each sex, and the difficulty of imposing objective standards on athletic programs that are
inherently different from institution to institution. Id Although OCR rejected these concerns,
the comments demonstrate that OCR should have been aware that the proposed regulations
were capable of greatly disrupting intercollegiate athletic programs.
110. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing the three-part test's inadequate treatment of
institutions with different competitive goals, inherent differences between men's and women's
interests, and structural differences among various athletic activities).
111. See Harris, supra note 82, at 65 (reporting that the federal courts limited relief under
Title IX to public remedies, prohibiting any private right of action).
112. I&
113. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). Cannon did not consider an implied right of action for the equal
right to participate in athletics. In Cannon, the Court considered arguments from a woman
petitioner that Title IX implies a private right of action. Id. at 680. The woman was denied
admission to two medical schools receiving federal funds, and alleged that the denial of
admission was a result of sex discrimination. Id. Overturning the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, the Court found that the plaintiff stated a valid cause of action under Title IX in her
complaint when she alleged that she was denied admission from the medical schools due to her
sex, and that both schools received federal funding. Il-
114. See id at 709 (holding that the words, history, and subject matter of Title IX are
sufficient to imply a cause of action).
115. See Harris, supra note 82, at 65 (noting that the decision in Cannon finally empowered
women to enforce their rights in court).
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the institution as a whole.16  The Supreme Court answered this
question definitively in Grove City College v. Bell"7 In Grove City College,
the Supreme Court adopted the program-specific view of Title IX,
and held that when an institution receives federal funds in only one
program, Tide IX's application is limited to that program only."
8
The Supreme Court's decision restricted Tide IX's application to the
few institutions that did receive federal funding for their athletic
programs."9 Reflecting the new restrictive application of Tide IX,
OCR chose to abandon all pending complaints against athletic
programs not meeting the program-specific test."'
In 1988, however, Congress reinstated Tide IX's application to
athletic programs by enacting the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987Y.12 The Act vacated the program-specific interpretation by the
Supreme Court in Grove City College in favor of a broad institution-
wide application of Title IX.123 Under the Act, Title IX now applied
to all post-secondary institutions where federal funds were granted to
121
any part of the institution. With this broad application of Tide IX
116. See Rice v. Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336, 338-39 (1st Cir. 1981) (adopting the
program-specific approach to Title IX enforcement, and refusing to find a cause of action
under Title IX without a claim arising in a program that received federal funds); University of
Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982) (holding that Title IX does not cover an
athletic department that does not receive federal funds). But cf Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688
F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (adopting the institution-wide approach, holding that
an athletic department is subject to Title IX's provisions when the university as a whole received
federal funds).
117. 465 U.S. 555 (1984). Grove City College, a private institution, attempted to retain
autonomy by consistently refusing state and federal financial assistance. Four of its students
sued to enjoin DED from forcing Grove City College to execute an Assurance of Compliance
under 34 C.F.RI § 106.4 (1982), following DED's finding that the college was subject to Title
IX's provisions. I&. at 558-61. DED based its finding on the fact that Grove City College
students had accepted Basic Educational Opportunity Grants ("BEOGs"). Id, at 559.
118. See id. at 573-74 (holding that Title IX cannot be applied institution-wide if only limited
programs within the institution accepted federal funds). The Supreme Court based its holding
on North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Belg 456 U.S. 512 (1982), which held that the Department of
Education's ability to promulgate regulations and to terminate funds pursuant to Title IX was
subject to program-specific limitations. Id. at 539.
119. See Harris, supra note 82, at 61 (observing that, following the Court's decision in Grove
City Colleg4 "lower courts refused to apply Title IX to athletic programs because few, if any,
receive direct federal funding").
120. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 767 (explaining OCR's reaction to the Grove City College
decision taking a narrow program-specific reading of Title IX, and noting the lower courts'
refusal to provide relief for disparate treatment as a result of this reaction).
121. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687). Congress
enacted the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 over a presidential veto by President Ronald
Reagan.
122. 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (holding that Title IX cannot be applied to the institution
as a whole if an individual department, other than the athletic department, accepts federal
funds).
123. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
124. See id. This section specifically applies Title IX to "all the operations of... a college,
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in hand, OCR revived its enforcement of Title IX in athletic
programs, and private litigants launched a new wave of litigation
addressing equal opportunities to participate in athletics.
The intensity of Title IX enforcement was supercharged in 1992 by
the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.12 6 In Franklin, a female high school student sued the school
district for monetary damages over continual sexual harassment by
her tenth grade sports coach and teacher.'2 Overturning the Court
of Appeals ruling, the Court held that a private litigant can collect
monetary damages from a defendant institution where the
discrimination is shown to be an intentional violation of Title IX.
2 1
In so ruling, the Court upheld the general rule that "all appropriate
relief is available in an action brought to vindicate a federal right
when Congress has given no indication of its purpose with respect to
remedies."'2
The Court's ruling in Franklin changed Title IX litigation in two
respects. First, the possibility of obtaining damages from a Title IX
suit encouraged plaintiffs and their attorneys to bypass filing a
complaint with OCR against an institution, in favor of pursuing a
private right of action in courtlss Thus, although OCR still
investigates institutions following a complaint filed with the agency,
the federal courts now have a substantial role in administering Title
IX proceedings. Second, the possibility that an institution may be
required to pay compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and punitive
damages, encourages defendant institutions to capitulate and settle
Title IX lawsuits.""' These two factors collectively create significant
university, or other post-secondary institution, or a public system of higher education... any
part of which is extended Federal financial assistance." Id.
125. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 767 (observing the increase in OCR's measures to
enforce Title IX following the enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987);Johnson,
supra note 82, at 565 (stating that following the enactment of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Title IX suits by female intercollegiate athletes increased significantly).
126. 508 U.S. 60 (1992).
127. I& at 63.
128. Id. at 76.
129. I. at 68 (citingJ.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)). The Court injI. Case Co.
held that the federal courts "have the power to grant all necessary remedial relief" for violations
of a federal act. 377 U.S. at 435.
130. SeeJohnson, supra note 82, at 556 n.19 (recognizing the incentive created by Franklin
for female athletes and their attorneys to litigate Title IX claims in order to receive punitive
damages following a court's finding of intentional discrimination).
131. Brief of Former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Caspar W. Weinberger, as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner's Brief at 3, Brown Univ. v. Cohen, 520 U.S. 1186
(1997) (No. 96-1321), cert. denied. See also Sal Roibal & Carol Herwig, North Carolina Boss to Head
Association, USA TODAYJune 21, 1993, at lC (describing the process for settlement of a Title
IX claim filed by female soccer players against Auburn University). As a result of the suit by the
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legal leverage for Title IX plaintiffs to alter an institution's athletic
offerings through either settlements orjudicial decisions.
D. Judicial Interpretation of Title IX Compliance and the Adoption of the
Three-Part Test
Following the 1992 Franklin Court's grant of legal leverage to Title
IX plaintiffs, female athlete plaintiffs have won almost all Title IX
suits alleging an unequal opportunity to participate. l2 Faced with
this losing track record, institutions have increasingly taken steps to
comply with Title IX.s Despite these steps to "stay on the sunny side
of Title IX," the majority of institutions still cannot meet the
standard of Title IX compliance established by the Title IX case law
decided after Franklin.3s
18 female soccer players, Auburn University paid $140,000 in damages and legal fees and
agreed to sponsor the women's varsity soccer team with a guaranteed team budget of $200,000
for the first two seasons of competition. Id
132. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 180 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Brown
University violated Title IX when it eliminated the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams);
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 828-33 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
university violated Title IX when it eliminated the men's baseball and women's fast-pitch
softball teams in the absence of statistical proportionality); Daniels v. School Bd., 985 F. Supp.
1458, 1463 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (granting plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction after
finding that the school board violated Title IX based upon the disparities between the girls'
softball and boys' baseball programs); Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117, 1131
(M.D. Ala. 1997) (denying Alabama State University's motion to dismiss finding that the
plaintiffs claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or standing requirements for
injunctive relief); Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 917 (M.D. La. 1996)
(holding that the university violated Title IX when it delayed creating women's soccer and fast-
pitch softball teams); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85 (W.D. Pa. 1993)
(granting an injunction to reinstate the eliminated women's field hockey and gymnastics teams
after finding that the university violated Title IX when it eliminated the teams). But cf Boucher
v. Syracuse Univ., 1998 WL 167296 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1998) (dismissing plaintiff's claim that
Syracuse University had violated Title IX because defendant sufficiently expanded participation
opportunities for female student athletes, thereby meeting the second prong of the three-part
test).
133. See Laurie Tarkan, Unequal Opportunity, in WOMEN'S SPORTS & FTNESS, Sept. 1995, at
25-26 (noting that between 1992 and 1995, member institutions added over 800 women's
athletic teams); Curtis & Grant, supra note 11 (finding that the NCAA has added over 600
women's athletic teams from 1994-1995 to the next academic year); GAO REPORT, supra note
11, at 6 (reporting that over 870 women's athletic teams were formed in a 12 year period, a 17
% increase).
134. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that any institution
that does not wish to review student interests and abilities in athletics may "stay on the sunny
side of Title IX simply by maintaining gender parity between its student body and its athletic
lineup").
135. See Chronicle of Higher Education, EADA Reports and Chronicle of Higher Education
Interviews of NCAA Division I Institutions (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy, & the Law) [hereinafter EADA Reports]
(finding that only 51 of the 306 NCAA Division I member institutions have athletic programs
with a proportion of women athletes within five percent of the proportion of women within the
student body, or greater). Only 10 NCAA Division I member institutions have athletic
programs with a proportion of women athletes that is equal to or greater than the proportion of
women within the institution's student body. I&
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The first series 'of Title IX cases, brought to enforce the "equal
opportunity to participate," were decided in the absence of pre-
existing case law at approximately the same time."'6 The courts
deferred to OCR's three-part test as the legal burden of proof in
reaching their decisions.17  Beginning with Cohen v. Brown
University,s the federal courts established a dominant interpretation
of the three-part test as the applicable legal framework.'
1. Cohen v. Brown University
In Cohen, members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball teams
sued Brown University ("Brown"), its President, and its Athletic
Director, alleging that Brown had discriminated against women in
the operation of its athletic programs.49 The suit arose in response to
Brown's demotion of the teams, along with the men's golf and water
polo teams, to "intercollegiate club" status.'4' As a club team, these
teams could continue to compete as they had before, provided that
all operating costs were paid by private sources.' Beginning with
136. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 980 (D.R.I. 1992) (remarking that the case
presented "novel issues concerning Title IX and athletic programs" because there was "virtually
no caselaw on point"). The district court was mistaken in its assertion, ignoring the decisions of
three previous cases. SeeAronberg, supra note 12, at 772 n.214 (reporting the decisions in Blair
v. Washington State Univ., 740 F.2d 1379 (Wash. 1987) (en banc); Cookv. Colgate Univ., 802 F.
Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982)).
137. See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 989-90 (finding that the appropriate method to determine
Title IX compliance must be determined through the three-part test). The court in Cohen
stated that compliance would be judged first through the three-part test, and then under the
"levels of competition" test. Id. Later decisions appear to have adopted this interpretation of
the legal standard for Title IX compliance as a matter of course. See Roberts v. Colorado State
Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 828-32 (10th Cir. 1993) (relying heavily on Cohen's application of the Policy
Interpretation in deciding that Colorado State University had violated Title IX). However, at-
least one court has rejected the Cohen application of the three-part test and adopted its own
interpretation of the legal standard for Tide IX compliance. See Pederson v. Louisiana State
Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913-14 (M.D. La. 1996) (disagreeing with Cohen's assertion that the
"substantial proportionality" prong is a "safe harbor" for institutions, protecting them from
Tide IX violation).
138. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen 1), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); 879 F.
Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen l), affld, 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1469
(1997). All four decisions stemmed from the same factual setting and litigation. The first two
cases involved the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, while the latter two concerned
the trial on the merits.
139. See Cohen , 809 F. Supp. at 990 (adopting the three-part test as the measure of Title IX
compliance).
140. Cohenf1, 101 F.3datl61.
141. Id. Brown anticipated a savings of over $77,000 per year following the demotion of
these four teams. Cohen/, 879 F. Supp. at 187 n.2. Brown expected to save over $62,000 and
over $15,000 from the demotion of the women's and men's teams, respectively. Id.
142. Cohenff, 991 F.2d 888, 892 (1st Cir. 1993). In addition to raising their own operational
expenses, intercollegiate club teams are not provided other benefits granted to full varsity
teams. Id. Some of these benefits include salaried coaches, prime training times and facilities,
office support, and admission preferences. Id.
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Cohen I, the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island and
the First Circuit handed down four opinions between 1992 and 1996
that established the dominant application of the three-part test for
judicial enforcement of Title IX.
Recognizing the absence of existing case law, the First Circuit in
Cohen H held that the Policy Interpretation is entitled to substantial
deference from the court as the responsible agency's interpretation
of its implementing regulations.' 43 The First Circuit concluded that,
as the court would apply the three-part test, the plaintiffs carried the
burden of proving that Brown had not satisfied the "substantial
proportionality" and "accommodation of interests" prongs.' 44 If the
plaintiffs met this burden, Brown then bore the burden of showing
that it met the "program expansion" prong.141
Applying the "substantial proportionality" prong, the First Circuit
upheld the district court's finding in Cohen H that, prior to and
following the demotion of the teams, Brown failed to provide athletic
opportunities for women athletes substantially proportionate to the
proportion of women students within the university's student body.'4
Brown argued that the substantial proportionality prong, as the
143. 101 F.3d 155 at 172-73. The court in Cohen H cited both Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Counci, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
499 U.S. 144 (199]), which establish the threshold requirements for deference to an enforcing
agency's interpretation. 14 at 173. The Court in Chevron held that when Congress has
delegated regulatory power to an agency, the resulting regulations should be given "controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." 467 U.S. at
844. In addition, the Court in Martin held that the Court "presume[s] that the power
authoritatively to interpret [the agency's] own regulations is a component of the agency's
delegated lawmaking powers." 499 U.S. at 151.
144. See Cohen 1,991 F.2d at 901-02 (establishing this burden of proof, the court declined to
adopt the Title VII burden setting and shifting model advocated by Brown University). Instead,
the court claimed that the adoption of the Title VII model was unnecessary because "the
controlling statutes and regulations are clear." Id at 991 (emphasis added). However, at least
two courts found a different allocation of the burden of proof through their interpretation of
the statute and regulations. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584 (W.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that the defendant institution bears the burden of proof on the second and
third prongs); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 743 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying Title VII
process analysis to Title IX cases at the urging of the parties), rev'd on other grounds, 992 F.2d 17
(2d Cir. 1993).
145. Cohen 1, 991 F.2d 888,902 (1st Cir. 1993).
146. See Cohen H, 879 F. Supp. 185, 192 (D.R.I. 1995) (finding that women students
represented 52.14% of Brown's undergraduate enrollment, but only 38.13% of student
athletes). For the purposes of determining the proportion of women athletes within Brown's
athletic program, the court interpreted "participation opportunities" strictly to mean the
number of actual participants in the athletic program. Id. at 202. The court rejected Brown's
interpretation that "participation opportunities" also included all opportunities left unfilled.
Id. at 203. The court also rejected Brown's argument that a Title VII scheme should be applied
that would compare the proportion of women athletes to the proportion of women from the
university's "qualified applicant pool" of women athletes, not the proportion of women in the
student body as a whole, in analyzing the substantial proportionality prong. Cohen 1, 101 F.3d
at 176-78.
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district court applied it in Cohen IT, turned Title IX into an affirmative
action statute that required universities to impose quotas for women's
athletic opportunities in excess of their relative interests and
abilities.H In addition, Brown contended that the case was subject to
review under the recently decided Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena.""
The First Circuit disagreed. The court first held that Brown's
argument that Cohen I's application of the three-part test effectively
requires affirmative action was without merit."9 The First Circuit
narrowly construed the term "affirmative action" finding that courts
historically limited its meaning to voluntary undertakings to remedy
past discrimination through specific group based preferences and
numeric goals.' Under this definition, the First Circuit stated that
the case did not present an affirmative issue and that Brown's
"talismanic" characterization was incorrect."'
The First Circuit then stated that the district court's application of
the three-part test under Cohen H did not impose a quota system. '
Despite the substantial proportionality prong's requirement that
schools provide athletic opportunities in proportion to each gender's
representation within the student body, the First Circuit concluded
that this was not a quota because a defendant must also fail the other
two prongs of the three-part test before the court could find
liability." Therefore, the court held, the existence of the second and
third prongs of the three-part test forecloses the possibility that the
three-part test imposes a quota system." The court further held that
substantial proportionality is merely the starting point for Title IX
147. See Cohen 1, 101 F.3d at 169-72 (addressing Brown's argument that the district court's
application of substantial proportionality amounted to affirmative action and a gender-based
quota). The First Circuit narrowly construed the meaning of "affirmative action" and found
that Brown's concern was unfounded. Id at 169-70. The court also stated that substantial
proportionality did not require the imposition of gender-based quotas. Id. at 170. The First
Circuit ruled that substantial proportionality presented a flexible standard, not a hard quota,
and was also only the beginning of a Title IX compliance review. Id. at 171.
148. ld at 181. See also Adarand, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (stating that the imposition of
quotas, preferential treatment, and disparate treatment require a compelling state interest and
that the remedial measure must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
149. Cohen 1, 101 F.3d at 172 (concluding that "[firom the mere fact that a remedy flowing
from ajudicial determination of discrimination is gender-conscious, it does not follow that the
remedy constitutes affirmative action[").
150. See id. at 170,172 (stating the court's limited definition of "affirmative action").
151. M at 170.
152. R at 176.
153. Id
154. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155,176 (lst Cir. 1996).
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analysis, providing a "safe harbor" for institutions by establishing a
rebuttable presumption of compliance.'
Turning next to its analysis of the third prong, the court held that
Brown failed to "fully and effectively" accommodate the interests and
abilities of its women students.'56 The First Circuit held that, because
the gymnastics and volleyball teams were competitive prior to their
demotion," sufficient evidence was present to demonstrate that
Brown had not fully accommodated the members of the women's
teams' competitive interests.5 Brown argued that OCR had not
defined the meaning of the term "fully and effectively.""' As Brown
read the term in the context of the Act and the Policy Interpretation,
the term could reasonably be interpreted to mean that institutions
are required to meet the interests and abilities of the
underrepresented gender only to the same extent that those
institutions meet the interests and abilities of the overrepresented
gender.6 The First Circuit rejected this argument and upheld the
district court's exclusion of evidence, which would have
demonstrated the relatively lower interest of women students to
compete in intercollegiate athletics.' s
After determining that the burden of proof shifted to Brown, the
First Circuit upheld the district court's holding that Brown had not
met the second prong.62 While Brown took great steps between 1971
and 1977 to expand athletic offerings for female students,1s6 Brown
155. Id. at 178 (citing Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1994)).
156. I& at 180.
157. Id. The district court in Cohen / noted that, when plaintiffs are members of a
competitively viable team, the burden of proving the third prong of the three-part test is
considerably easier. Cohen 1I, 879 F. Supp. 185, 212 (D.RI. 1995). In cases where plaintiffs are
seeking the formation or the elevation of a team, the identification of the plaintiff' interests
and abilities is considerably more difficult. Id. at 211 (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 904).
158. See Cohen II, 101 F.3d at 180 (adopting the reasoning of the Clarification). The First
Circuit, quoting the Clarification, held that the university bears the burden of providing "strong
evidence" that the presumed interest of the eliminated team's members, their ability, or
available competition no longer exist following the elimination of the team. Id. (quoting the
Clarification at 8-9 n.2).
159. I. at 174.
160. Id.
161. See id (citing Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 898, holding that the third prong requires "not
merely some accommodation, but full and effective accommodation"). But see Cohen I, 101
F.3d at 194-95 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that "full and effective" is open to two
reasonable interpretations and that the First Circuit's reading of the term creates a "perhaps
impossibly" high requirement for institutions to meet and would make the third prong an
"irrelevant addition to the test"). For further discussion of Chief Judge Torruella's dissent in
Cohen I, see infra Part 1V.B and accompanying notes.
162. See Cohen I, 101 F.3d at 173.
163. See Cohen 1, 879 F. Supp. at 211 (holding that Brown had improved the quality of its
women's athletic programs); Hearing, supra note 10, at 78 (statement of Vartan Gregorian,
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could not satisfy the second prong because it had not continuously
expanded opportunities for women athletes." The court also held
that Brown's downsizing of its men's athletic program was not
equivalent to program expansion under the second prong, despite
increasing the proportion of women athletes in its athletic
165
program.
2. Cohen I's Progeny: Exchanging Critical Analysis for Expediency
Between the district court's decision in Cohen I and the First
Circuit's ruling in Cohen HI, two significant Title IX cases were
decided: Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvanidrs and Roberts v.
Colorado State University.67 These cases adopted the district court's
reasoning in Cohen I, granted the Policy Interpretation substantial
deference, and applied the three-part test consistent with Cohen I's
holding in reaching their decisions. 16s Not surprisingly, both courts
cited Cohen I extensively throughout their opinions in support of
their holdings. 9 Interestingly, however, the First Circuit in turn
relied extensively on Favia and Roberts, and its adoption of Cohen I, to
demonstrate the correctness of its own reasoning in Cohen 11 7
In Favia, members of the women's gymnastics and field hockey
teams sued to have the university reinstate their teams, which were
President, Brown University) (stating that Brown University offers 18 varsity sports for women,
more than double the national average).
164. Id. Although Brown offered 14 varsity teams for men and 13 for women at the time of
the suit, the court found that Brown had failed to add a women's team since women's indoor
track was added in 1982. Id. at 189, 211. Subsequent to the filing of the original lawsuit, Brown
also added women's skiing in 1994. Id. at 211.
165. Cohen , 879 F. Supp. at 211. The district court held that increasing the proportion of
Brown's women students participating in intercollegiate athletics was also relevant, and was not
accomplished by downsizing the men's program. But see Cohen 11, 101 F.3d 155, 193 (1st Cir.
1996) (Torruella, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that, because the three-part test is based upon
relative participation rates, as evidenced by the substantial proportionality prong, the district
court's application of the second prong requires institutions to increase both the relative and
absolute participation rates of its women students in intercollegiate athletics). For further
discussion of ChiefJustice Tourella's dissenting opinion, see infra Part IV.B and accompanying
notes.
166. 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), appeal to modify injuncion denied, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993).
167. 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), afg 814F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993).
168. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29 (adopting the Policy Interpretation's delineation of the
three general areas of Title IX compliance and the three-part test); Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583-84
(granting the Policy Interpretation great deference and adopting the Policy Interpretation's
three-part test).
169. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 829-33; Favia, 7 F.3d at 342.
170. See generally Cohen 1, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (containing multiple citations toFavia
and Roberts).
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discontinued following budgetary cutbacks. 17 Granting the plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction to reinstate the discontinued
women's teams, the court held that Indiana University of
Pennsylvania ("-UP") failed to meet any portion of the Policy
Interpretation's three-part test.172 However, unlike Cohen (I or fl),
following the court's decision against IUP, the university moved to
modify the preliminary injunction to replace the women's gymnastics
team with a new women's soccer team.173  IUP argued that the
modification would allow substantial progress toward the equal
opportunity to participate by increasing the proportion of female
athletes from 38.97% to 43.02%.'74 The district court denied the
motion to modify the injunction and UP appealed to the Third
Circuit.7 5 The Third Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling, holding
that, even if modifying the injunction would increase the proportion
of women athletes, the university would still not meet the substantial
proportionality prong.176  Therefore, the Third Circuit concluded,
IUP could not elect to replace viable teams with replacement teams
until substantial proportionality was attained, even if the replacement
of the gymnastics team with a new soccer team provided more
opportunities for women athletes.
77
171. See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579-80 (noting that the plaintiffi sued for a preliminary
injunction to prevent IUP from eliminating two women's sports due to an athletic budget
cutback of $350,000). In a move similar to the facts in Cohen, Indiana University of
Pennsylvania discontinued the men's soccer and tennis teams along with both women's teams.
Id.
172. IML at 584-85. Under the first prong, the court found that the proportion of women
athletes actually dropped from 37.77% to 36.51% following the program cutbacks. Id. Because
neither figure was substantially proportional to the proportion of women students, the
university failed to meet the first prong. Id. at 584. The university also failed to meet the
second prong because the 1991 budget cuts eliminated participation opportunities for women.
Id. Finally, IUP could not satisfy the third prong of the three-part test because the eliminated
women's teams were viable and competitive prior to their elimination. Id. The court also
rejected IUP's argument that financial considerations justified the elimination of the teams,
instead holding that financial considerations alone cannot justify gender discrimination. Id.
(quoting Hafferv. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517,530 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
173. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1993) (reporting that IUP
argued that the inclusion of the women's soccer team would successfully further the goals of
Title IX by providing more opportunities for women athletes and providing greater recruiting
funds for women athletes because of the lower operation cost of women's soccer). The district
court initially denied the motion to modify the preliminary injunction because it would amount
to vacating the original injunctive order. Id. at 336-37.
174. See id. at 343 (recognizing that exchanging a women's soccer team for the women's
gymnastics and field hockey teams could result in a greater proportion of women athletes).
IUP also argued that replacement of the 15 member women's gymnastics team with a 50
member soccer team would also save $100,000 in operating expenses per year that IUP could
then use to enhance recruitment of women athletes. Id at 343 n.21.
175. Id. at336-37.
176. Id. at 343-44.
177. See Favia, 7 F.3d 332, 343-45 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing the court's holding in Cohen I that
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Similarly, the defendants in Roberts presented an appeal to the
Tenth Circuit after the district court granted a permanent injunction
to reinstate the Colorado State University ("CSU") women's varsity
fast pitch softball team, which CSU discontinued as part of cutbacks
in its athletic department.1 78 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's granting of the permanent injunction after determining that
CSU violated Title IX, 179 but rejected the district court's attempt to
"micromanage" CSU's method of complying with the injunction.'
Applying the three-part test, the Tenth Circuit held that CSU failed
to meet any prong.8' CSU argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove
that CSU had not adequately met the interests and abilities of women
athletes because the university eliminated more athletic opportunities
for men than women during the cutbacks.8 2  The Tenth Circuit
rejected this claim, holding that an institution cannot defend itself
once the plaintiffs establish a primafacie case under the three-part test
by arguing that the elimination of athletic opportunities fell
disproportionately on the overrepresented gender."
an institution must either satisfy the substantial proportionality or accommodation of interests
prongs, in the absence of program expansion).
178. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 826, 831 (10th Cir. 1993).
(discussing, like Cohen and Favia, the elimination of men's ball teams at each university).
179. See id. at 827-33 (holding that CSU violated the first and third prongs, and could not
demonstrate a continuous or historic expansion of women's athletic opportunities).
180. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 834-35 (holding that the district court has the power to ensure
that the reinstated varsity women's softball team has the same benefits of other varsity sports
teams offered by the institution, but does not have the power to require CSU to field a women's
softball team for a fall exhibition season in addition to the standard spring season). The Tenth
Circuit rejected CSU's claim that the district court had exceeded it powers by requiring that the
women's softball team receive all the benefits of varsity status. Id. However, the Tenth Circuit
found that the district court did exceed its power by requiring that the team play a fall
exhibition season in addition to the regular spring season required for varsity competition. Id.
at 835. See also Cohen if, 101 F.3d 155, 187-88 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court
exceeded its powers by rejecting Brown's plan to comply with Tide IX, thereby granting Brown
another opportunity to submit a plan).
181. See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-32 (applying the three-part test and explaining its reasoning
that CSU had failed to satisfy any prong). The court first determined that the number of
women athletes was not substantially proportionate to the undergraduate enrollment, finding a
10.5% disparity. Id. at 830. The court also found that CSU could not satisfy the program
expansion prong noting that the university had not added a women's athletic team since 1977.
I& Finally, the Tenth Circuit rejected CSU's argument that the full interests and abilities of
women athletes had been met. Id at 832.
182. See id. at 831-32 (noting CSU's argument that plaintiffs could not demonstrate a
violation of the interest and ability prong of the three-part test when CSU had accommodated
the interests of male athletes to the same extent as it had female athletes). In the last round of
cutbacks, the women's softball team was eliminated along with the men's baseball team. Id.
Thus, CSU argued that Titie IX was not violated because the university was only obligated to
accommodate the interests of female athletes to the same extent as they accommodated male
athletes' interests. Id.
183. See id. at 831 (rejecting CSU's argument that it cannot be liable under Title IX because
more male athletes suffered as a result of athletic cutbacks than female athletes).
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3. Left in Cohen's Wake: Unsuccessful Title IX Lawsuits Brought by
Male Athlete Plaintiffs
While Cohen, Favia, and Roberts illustrate the near invincibility of
female athlete plaintiffs in Title IX cases,s male athlete plaintiffs
have not been as successful." In fact, no male plaintiff has ever
prevailed.86  Under Cohen's application of the substantial
proportionality prong, the proportion of male athletes within a
typical institution's athletic program is disproportionately high, thus
precluding standing to bring a Title IX lawsuit.87
For example, in Kelley v. Board of Trusteess members of the men's
swimming team alleged that the University of Illinois violated Title IX
and the Equal Protection Clause'89 when it terminated the men's
swimming program but retained the women's program.' Although
184. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 180 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Brown
University violated Title IX following the elimination of the women's gymnastics and volleyball
teams); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 828-33 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
CSU violated Title IX when it eliminated the women's fast-pitch softball team); Daniels v.
School Bd., 985 F. Supp. 1458, 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that the school board violated
Title IX due to unreasonable disparities between the girls' softball and boys' baseball
programs); Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 966 F. Supp. 1117, 1131 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding
that plaintiffs Title IX claims were not barred by the statute of limitations or standing
requirements for injunctive relief); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 584-85 (W.D.
Pa. 1993) (reinstating the eliminated women's field hockey and gymnastics teams after finding
that the university violated Title IX). But cf Boucher v. Syracuse Univ., No. 95-CV-620, 1998 WL
167296, at 4 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) (dismissing female athlete plaintiff's Title IX claim after
determining that the university had established a historic and continuous expansion of
women's athletic programs).
185. See generally Kelley v. University of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 243-44 (C.D. Ill. 1993)
(rejecting male athletes' claims brought under Tide IX and the Equal Protection Clause), aff'd,
35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994),reviewed on merits, 837 F. Supp. 989, 995-97 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
(denying plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction requiring that the university reinstate
its intercollegiate wrestling program); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1005-06 (S.D.
Iowa 1995) (denying plaintiff's Title IX claim on its merits); Aronberg, supra note 12, at 782
(attributing the near perfect track record of female Title IX plaintiffi to the almost impossible
burden imposed by the three-part test, arguing that the substantial proportionality prong of the
three-part test is the only prong that the courts genuinely apply).
186. See Ferrier, supra note 89, at 868 (citing the examples of Kelley and Gonyo). But cf. Neal
v. Board of Trustees, No. CV-F-97-5009 (E.D. Cal. filed Dec. 26, 1997) (preserving male
plaintiffs' Title IX violation claim following defendant's motion to dismiss).
187. See Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004-05 (stating that the substantial proportionality prong
forecloses plaintiff's suit because the proportion of male athletes is disproportionately high).
188. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), aff'g 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. Ill. 1993).
189. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
190. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 267 (summarizing the plaintiffs' complaint). The University of
Illinois cut the men's swimming team, along with three other athletic teams, due to a significant
deficit in the university's athletic budget. I& at 269. On appeal from the district court's
decision, the Seventh Circuit found that, at the time the suit was filed, the proportion of women
athletes was only 23.4% while women represented 44% of the student body. Id.
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the district court stated that it was sympathetic to the unfortunate loss
of men's opportunities from the implementation of Title IX, it felt
bound to rule against the plaintiffs.'' The Seventh Circuit upheld
the lower court's decision, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that
substantial proportionality improperly mandates statistical balancing
of male and female athletes in proportion to their enrollment.'92 The
appellate court held that the three-part test simply creates a
presumption of compliance when the defendants satisfy substantial
proportionality.9 3  The court also denied the plaintiffs' Equal
Protection claim because, under the intermediate scrutiny test, 9 the
law permits discriminatory remedial measures provided that they are
substantially related to prohibiting gender discrimination. 9 '
Accordingly, the court held that Title IX permits institutions to
terminate athletic programs on the basis of sex if the determination is
related to ending sex discrimination in athletics. 6
The district court in Gonyo v. Drake University97 also held that
members of the discontinued men's wrestling team were not entitled
to relief under either Title IX or the Equal Protection Clause.9 Like
Kelley, in Gonyo, male athletes disproportionately outnumbered
female athletes.' However, Gonyo differed from Kelley, and other
previous Title IX cases, because female athletes received a
disproportionate number of athletic scholarships, thereby presenting
191. See KLey, 832 F. Supp. at 243-44 (stating that "the Court is not unsympathetic to the
plight of members of the men's swimming team and recognizes that Congress, in enacting Title
IX, probably never anticipated that it would yield such draconian results"). Nonetheless, the
district court felt compelled to follow the judicial development of Title IX because the statute
provided equal access to educational and athletic facilities for both sexes. Id.
192. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271 (rejecting the defendant's claim that the Policy Interpretation
established a gender-based quota system).
193. See id. (arguing that the alleged quota system under the substantial proportionality
requirement was merely one way that an institution could achieve compliance with Title IX).
Therefore, the court held that the Policy Interpretation did not create a gender-based quota
system because institutions can comply with Tide IX through program expansion or
accommodation of interests. Id-
194. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 728 (1982) (observing that
remedial measures mandated by Congress are constitutionally permissible if they serve
important governmental objectives and the means are substantially related to achieving that
goal). Under intermediate scrutiny, statutory classifications must be "substantially related" to
an "important government objective." Id. at 721.
195. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 272 (following the Court's holding in Hogan, 458 U.S. at 728).
196. See id. (finding that cutting men's teams is permissible under Title IX because it is
substantially related to protecting the interests of women athletes).
197. 879 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
198. See Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1001 (summarizing the plaintiff' claim).
199. See id. at 1004 (finding that male athletes represented 75% of Drake's athletes but only
42% of its students).
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a second consideration for Tide IX compliance.00 Under the Policy
Interpretation, institutions violate Tide IX if athletic scholarships and
financial aid are not allocated in "proportion to the number of
students of each sex participating in intercollegiate athletics." °1 In
granting the university's motion for summary judgment, the court
ruled that the three-part test superceded the athletics scholarship
test ° in determining Title IX compliance .2 " Accordingly, under the
three-part test, the court found that the majority of benefits provided
by the university favored male athletes, even though female athletes
may have received more scholarship funding.0 4 Thus, the court held
that the plaintiffs were precluded from relief under Title IX because
they were members of the overrepresented sex.20'
E. Cohen's Application of the Three-Part Test: Establishing the Supremacy
of Substantial Proportionality
Several observations become clear after analyzing Cohen I and its
progeny. First, by accepting Cohen's application of the three-part test,
the courts have established the substantial proportionality prong as
the legal standard for Title IX compliance.06 Under Cohen's
application of the three-part test, both the program expansion and
accommodation of interests prongs are consumed and negated by
200. See id. at 1004 (noting that plaintiffs correctly distinguished previous Title IX cases as
not addressing the question of disparate scholarship allocation).
201. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,415 (1979) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(a)).
202. See Gonyo, 879 F. Supp. at 1004-05. The scholarship test does not require that
institutions provide a proportional number of scholarships to members of each sex or that the
amount of each award be similar. Id. at 1005. The test simply requires that the total amount of
financial aid given to each sex must be proportional to each sex's enrollment. Id
203. See id. at 1005-06 (stating that the finding of a Title IX violation under the three-part
test would preclude relief for disparate scholarship allocation). However, the court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs had distinguished previous cases because those cases did not
address the scholarship disparity issue. Id. at 1005. Nonetheless, the court found that although
the athletic scholarships served as a significant aspect for athletic opportunity, this aspect was
still subordinate to the equal athletic opportunity requirement in determining Title IX
compliance. Id at 1006.
204. See id. at 1006 (holding that the athletic scholarship test is subordinate to the athletic
opportunities test).
205. Id. at 1004-05.
206. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 782 (rejecting OCR's contention that the substantial
proportionality prong is a "safe harbor" to protect institutions from Title IX liability, arguing
that it is the only standard that the courts analyze in determining Title IX compliance);
Bemardo, supra note 97, at 342 (arguing that the substantial proportionality prong has become
the sole benchmark for compliance "given the absence of other conformity avenues"); Leahy,
supra note 40, at 527 (noting that substantial proportionality is the essence of each of the three-
part test's prongs, thereby elevating substantial proportionality to a higher significance than the
other two prongs). In fact, if an institution decides to reduce the size of its athletic program,
the substantial proportionality prong is the only possible means of Title IX compliance. Id.
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the substantial proportionality prong. 7 As a result, the court has
transformed Title IX from an anti-discrimination statute intended to
prevent sex discrimination in education, into an affirmative action
statute that requires institutions to implement gender-based quotas.
20 8
For example, three problems arise under Cohen's application of the
three-part test when a university attempts to put forth a program
expansion defense. First, few institutions can meet the standard of
"historic and continued expansion" established in Cohen.0 Because
the Cohen application arose more than twenty years after the
enactment of Title IX, only institutions that fortuitously expanded
their women's athletics programs consistent with Cohen's reading of
the Policy Interpretation can satisfy the program expansion
defense. Ironically, Cohen's application of the second prong
actually protects institutions that add women's teams according to a
timetable, instead of according to the interests of women athletes.
In fact, institutions that ambitiously expanded their women's athletic
program following the enactment of Title IX cannot satisfy the
second prong under Cohen, if they have not continued to expand
women's athletic opportunities up to the present day. 12 Institutions
207. See Bernando, supra note 97, at 342-43 (stating that the second prong of the three-part
test is "wholly dependent" upon the substantial proportionality statistical balance, and that the
third prong is reduced to an assessment of substantial proportionality and is clearly not an
"independent means of compliance").
208. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 193 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, CJ., dissenting)
(arguing that the First Circuit's opinion sets an extremely difficult standard to meet by forcing
institutions to historically and continually increase the total number of women athletes, not
simply the proportion of women athletes necessary to satisfy the second prong); Mahoney, supra
note 22, at 944 (asserting that the substantial proportionality prong's requirement of statistical
balancing of athletic opportunities "is a 'quota system'-in every sense of the words"); George
A. Davidson & Carla A. Kerr, Title 1X What is GendtrEquityn, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.j. 25, 30
(1995) (proposing that substantial proportionality is significantly different than Title IX's
original purpose-to identify discrimination in varsity athletics).
209. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (recognizing
that only a few schools will be able to satisfy Titie IX's effective accommodation requirement by
expanding their women's athletic programs); Aronberg, supra note 12, at 784-86 (observing
that the second prong of the three-part test is impossible to satisfy without expanding an
institution's athletic budget for funding new athletic teams, which is an unattractive proposition
at a time when athletic budgets are being reduced); Ferrier, supra note 89, at 867 (noting that
the courts have been unable to explain how to satisfy the second prong of the three-part test
without huge additional expenditures).
210. See Hearing supra note 10, at 79 (statement of Vartan Gregorian, President, Brown
University) (asserting that Brown was unable to satisfy the second prong of the three-part test
because it provided too many opportunities for women athletes too quickly and was, therefore,
unable to satisfy the "continuous" requirement of the prong).
211. See Ferrier, supra note 89, at 888 n.298 (illustrating how a hypothetical university could
satisfy the second prong simply by adopting a plan to add one women's athletic team every two
years). But cf. Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that the second prong requires
universities to adhere to the pace of student interest in providing opportunities).
212. See Hearing supra note 10, at 79 (statement of Vartan Gregorian, President, Brown
University) (suggesting that the court's interpretation of the second prong in Cohen essentially
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that have periodically added a women's athletic team every few years
will satisfy the program expansion prong under Cohen's analysis.
Finally, the program expansion prong under Cohen serves merely as a
rest stop for an institution moving toward meeting substantial
proportionality.214  As a result of the problems with Cohen's
application of the second prong, institutions will elect to meet the
defined goal of substantial proportionality.
215
Substantial proportionality under the Cohen application of the
three-part test also absorbs the accommodation of interests prong.26
While these decisions did not address the issue of a plaintiff seeking
to create new athletic opportunities,2 7 the courts have silently
adopted a per se rule that educational institutions cannot satisfy the
accommodation of interests prong in cases involving an eliminated
program.1 The courts' reasoning is that every eliminated program
necessarily demonstrates that sufficient interest and ability were
present prior to elimination. 19 Unfortunately, this rule is so powerful
ignored Brown's immediate creation of numerous athletic opportunities for women athletes
while encouraging other institutions to take their time and only provide incremental changes).
213. See Bernardo, supra note 97, at 343 n.266 (noting that the Cohen court's interpretation
of the second prong is "poor policy" because it grants compliance to schools that drag their feet
and satisfy Title IX with periodic additions of women's teams).
214. See id. at 343 (arguing that the program expansion prong is not independent of the
substantial proportionality prong because the Cohen court's interpretation of the program
expansion prong requires institutions to demonstrate that they are moving to substantial
proportionality); Aronberg, supra note 12, at 786 (stating that the only way that an institution
can be certain that it is has satisfied the second prong is to expand opportunities for women
athletes until it has reached substantial proportionality). Cohen's application of both the
substantial proportionality prong and the program expansion prong ultimately requires gender
parity, the former requiring it in a single bound but the latter allowing for incremental steps.
Bernardo, supra note 97, at 343.
215. See Aaronberg, supra note 12 at 785-86 (explaining that the collapsing of the program
expansion prong into the substantial proportionality prong has led some institutions to elect
substantial proportionality as their method of complying with Title IX). In choosing substantial
proportionality to comply with Title IX, institutions generally will eliminate men's teams rather
than add women's teams to the athletic program in order to remain within budgetary restraints.
Id
216. See Aaronberg, supra note 12, at 786 (noting that unless and until female participation
rates are substantially proportionate, no expansion of an athletic program can reliably be said
to have satisfied the interests and abilities of student athletes).
217. Cf Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 901-02 (M.D. La. 1996)
(deciding whether to grant an affirmative injunction against the university to implement
proposed women's fast-pitch softball and soccer teams).
218. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 42 (observing that if the "full and effectively
accommodated" language of the third prong is applied literally, every institution that eliminates
a viable, competitive women's athletic program will necessarily violate the prong);
CLARIFICATION, supra note 98 (finding that the elimination of a viable women's athletic team
will violate the second and third prongs, unless the elimination is accompanied by a reduction
in the number of opportunities for male athletes so that substantial proportionality is met).
219. See Cohen , 879 F. Supp. 185, 212-13 (D.R.I. 1995) (holding that Brown violated the
third prong when it downgraded four viable women's teams that had been competing at the
varsity level). The court held that Brown violated the third prong in two regards: first, by failing
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that the First Circuit in Cohen I! upheld the district court's rejection
of surveys of student interests, statistical evidence, and questionnaires
given to incoming students that demonstrated that Brown had fully
and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of its female
students.220 Because Cohen indicates that institutions may not present
statistical evidence that they have met the third prong, the Cohen line
of decisions eliminated the accommodation of interests prong as a
method of Tite IX compliance.22'
Thus, under Cohen's application of the three-part test, substantial
proportionality is the only available method to comply with Titie
IX.222 Not surprisingly, Tite IX has been transformed from an anti-
discrimination statute into an affirmative action statute, finding
violations only where athletic participation is not statistically
balanced. 22' This transformation cannot be legally supported because
Congress clearly prohibited statistical balancing and sex based
determinations in educational programs receiving federal funds. 4
In addition, Cohen's application of the three-part test benefits
women athletes by protecting them from athletic budget cuts, leaving
male athletes to bear the burden of absorbing these cuts. 2 Titie IX
supporters argue that men's athletic programs historically enjoyed an
to increase the number of women athletes in its athletic program by elevating teams with a
demonstrated interest and ability to compete on the varsity level, and, second, by failing to
maintain the varsity teams that it had downgraded. Id.
220. See Cohen I, 101 F.3d 155, 179 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that statistics and surveys may be
used to demonstrate student interest but could not be used as a lack-of-interest defense to a
Title IX suit). The First Circuit stated that "even if it can be empirically demonstrated that, at a
particular time, women have less interest in sports than do men, such evidence, standing alone,
cannotjustify providing fewer athletic opportunities for women than for men." Id. at 179.
221. See Bermardo, supra note 97, at 343 (asserting that the third prong is a shield against
Title IX liability only if the institution can be excused from meeting substantial proportionality
due to "insufficient female interest and ability").
222. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 967 (arguing that by strictly applying the three-part test,
the courts have imposed statistical balancing of athletic opportunities between the sexes).
223. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 531-32 (arguing that proportionality is equivalent to
affirmative action because the three-part test is premised on the unrealistic and unsupported
assumption that athletic interest among women is proportional to their enrollment at an
undergraduate institution). Ironically, the court's application of Title IX would not find
discrimination within the athletic programs of institutions with a long-standing history of
gender-based discrimination. For example, both the Citadel and the Virginia Military Institute
are Title IX compliant under Cohen because both meet the court's application of substantial
proportionality. Participation: Proportion of Female Students on Athletic Teams (visited Aug. 4, 1999)
<http://wv.chronicle.com>.
224. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 522 (discussing the legislative intent of Title IX); Mahoney,
supra note 22, at 944 (observing that the statutory language and the legislative history dictate
that Title IX is not an affirmative action statute and that quota systems should not be used to
implement the law).
225. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 258 (noting that men are not afforded the same
protections from athletic budget cuts as women because Title IX protections are rationalized to
be unavailable to male athlete plaintiffs).
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unreasonable share of opportunities and resources because they did
not have to compete with women's athletic programs for resources
until recently.226 Furthermore, supporters of Tide IX argue that
men's athletic programs, particularly revenue-producing sports, must
bear the cost of eliminating "wasteful spending" to comply with Title
IX.2 7  However, while institutions attempt to comply with Tide IX,
they are reluctant to restrict men's revenue-producing sports because
of the financial and social benefits they produce.128  Because
institutions wish to retain the benefits of men's revenue-producing
sports, and must support women's athletic programs armed with
Cohen's application of the three-part test, men's non-revenue-
producing sports bear the brunt of the athletic departments'
budgetary woes.2 The unfair burden placed on men's non-revenue-
producing sports is exacerbated by Cohen's and OCR's acceptance of
eliminating men's athletic programs and opportunities, in order for
schools to meet the substantial proportionality prong.2 °  To many
institutions, this solution-commonly referred to as Title IX's
"unintended consequences"-appears to be the easiest, most clearly
defined, and most cost-effective method to comply with Title IX.2
31
226. See Weistart, supra note 18, at 199 (stating that men's athletic programs have had a 100-
year head start over women's athletics in building interest and ability and in generating
financial support).
227. See Weistart, supra note 18, at 248 (arguing that because most athletic budget
expenditures pay for the costs of men's revenue-producing sports, those sports should reduce
the injury to women's sports by reducing their operating costs).
228. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 303 (arguing that the "profit center" theory of
commercialized intercollegiate athletics holds that certain popular sports generate revenue for
the university and promote "increased student and alumni cohesion"). In addition to a greater
sense of community within the student body and its alumni, universities benefit from the
"visibility, publicity, and fund-raising services from their athletic programs." Mark R. Whitmore,
Denying Scholarship Athletes Worker's Compensation: Do Courts Punt Away a Statutory Right?, 76 IOWA
L. REv. 763, 782 (1991). But cf. Porto, supra note 10, at 397 (stating that the commercial model
of college sports exacts disproportionately high costs for the benefits that the university
receives); Weistart, supra note 18, at 201 (arguing that university administrators help perpetuate
higher expenditures for men's revenue-producing sports because they come from a
background that accepts the hierarchy of intercollegiate athletics).
229. See Susan M. Shook, Note, The Title IX Tug-of-War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990s:
Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes in the Scramble for Survival 71 IND. LJ. 773, 773-74
(1996) (observing that institutions have turned to reducing their men's athletic programs to
satisfy Titie IX, and that, consequently, many non-revenue-producing sports have been
indirectly injured through program elimination).
230. See Cohen/1, 991 F.2d 888, 898 n.15 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that universities may comply
with Title IX by downgrading and eliminating opportunities for the overrepresented sex to
achieve substantial proportionality); Letter from Norma V. Cantu, DED's Assistant Secretary for
Civil Rights, to interested parties 3-4 (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Cantu] (asserting that
institutions may cap or eliminate men's athletic programs to comply with substantial
proportionality).
231. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that
"[flinancially strapped institutions may still comply with Title IX by cutting athletic programs
such that men's and women's athletic participation rates become substantially proportionate to
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F. Extending Cohen: OCR's Clarification of the Policy Interpretation
In addition to the federal courts that have followed Cohen's
application of the three-part test and substantial proportionality,
OCR also adopted Cohen as its official method for determining Title
IX compliance. 2  The OCR extension grants Cohen government
approval and nationwide application, moving it far beyond the
jurisdictions of the four circuit courts that originally adopted its
holding.
Following the Republican party's takeover of Congress in
November 1994, and shortly after the district court rendered its
opinion in Cohen , the House Subcommittee on Post-secondary
Education, Training and Life-long Learning held hearings on Title
IX and its unintended consequences. s During the hearing, the
Subcommittee heard testimony from numerous parties criticizing the
vagueness of the three-part test and pleading for OCR to clarify how
to comply with the three-part test.' Also testifying at the hearing was
Norma V. Cantu, the Department of Education's Assistant Secretary
for Human Rights, who defended OCR's enforcement of Title IX. 25
After the hearing, Representatives Howard "Buck" McKeon and
Steve Gunderson instructed Cantu to provide further guidance for
Title IX compliance or possibly face legislative clarification by
Congress. 6 Cantu agreed to provide greater clarification, and on
September 20, 1995, OCR released a draft Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test for
public comment. 7 Cantu emphasized that the Clarification was not
an attempt to modify either Title IX's regulation or the Policy
Interpretation, but instead was an attempt to illustrate how OCR will
their representation in the undergraduate population"); Aronberg, supra note 12, at 785-86
(noting that cutting men's athletic programs may serve as the most cost-effective and
reasonable way to achieve Title IX compliance under the substantial proportionality prong);
Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 43-44 (stating that the message from the court in Roberts
clearly advocates that "[i]nstitutions should comply by cutting men's teams without regard to
men's interests and abilities for varsity competition or how short the men's program falls from
equally accommodating the abilities and interests of male students").
232. Cantu, supra note 230.
233. See generally Heating; supra note 10.
234. See Heating; supra note 10, at 9-120. The Subcommittee heard testimony from
CongressmanJ. Dennis Hastert, Vartan Gregorian, President of Brown University, and David L.
Jorns, President of Eastern Illinois University, regarding the difficulty of complying with OCR's
enforcement of Title IX. Hearing, supra note 10, at 9-120.
235. See Hearing, supra note 10, at 101-20 (arguing that OCR was doing the best job
possible).
236. Curtis& Grant, supranote 11.
237. CLARICATION, supra note 98.
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consider compliance "in concrete terms. "2s' However, the draft
Clarification did little more than repeat OCR's current procedures,
which were consistent with Cohen's application of the three-part test.
23 9
After receiving more than 200 comments from interested parties,
OCR issued a final Clarification on January 16, 1996, just before the
First Circuit's decision in Cohen H.2 o Mostly unchanged from the
draft Clarification, the final Clarification failed to reflect the
numerous suggestions OCR received during the thirty-day comment
period.2 ' These suggestions included a proposal from several parties
to incorporate "opportunity slots" into the evaluation of substantial
proportionality.21 Under this proposal, OCR's method of calculating
participation opportunities by strictly counting the number of
students actually participating in athletic programs would expand to
include open participation slots left unfilled due to low interest
and/or ability level among the student body.243
The Clarification maintained OCR's policy of rejecting "cookie
cutter" standards for compliance, but did little to provide the needed
clarification that the Subcommittee requested.2  In a letter
accompanying the Clarification, Cantu maintained that "OCR does
not require quotas."45 However, while stating that OCR will make
compliance determinations under substantial proportionality "on a
case-by-case basis," OCR provided several concrete examples that
indicated the existence of a five percent quota.24  Describing a
hypothetical institution with an enrollment of fifty-two percent
women and an athletic program comprised of forty-seven percent
women students and 600 total athletes, Cantu indicated that the
institution would not comply with Title IX because the five percent
disparity represented sixty-two additional women that could be
accommodated-enough to field an additional viable women's
team. 47 This hypothetical indicates that a disparity of five percent
238. Letter from Norma V. Cantu, DED's Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, to interested
parties 1 (Sept. 20, 1995).
239. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 763 (stating that the draft Clarification simply
maintained the status quo).
240. SeeAronberg, supra note 12, at 763; see also CLARIFICATION, supra note 98.
241. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 763 (describing the Clarification as "relatively
unchanged," despite 200 public comments).
242. SeeAronberg, supra note 12, at 763.
243. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 763.
244. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 763.
245. Cantu, supra note 230, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
246. CLARIICATION, supra note 98, at 5.
247. CLARICATION, supra note 98, at 5.
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between the proportion of women in the student body as a whole and
the institution's athletic program is a per se violation of substantial
proportionality.218 On the other hand, an institution may meet
substantial proportionality if the disparity is less than five percent and
no additional viable women's team could be added.2 9
Although the Clarification simply maintained the status quo, it
demonstrates some of OCR's incorrect assumptions in enforcing
Tide IX in athletics." ° The Clarification maintains the Policy
Interpretation's unproven and unsubstantiated assumption that men
and women college students have the same interest and ability to
compete in intercollegiate athletics.2s In addition, the Clarification
does not accurately reflect the economic and logistic realities that
face athletic programs. The Clarification, which is consistent with
Cohen, expects institutions to achieve proportionality by creating the
requisite additional number of opportunities for women athletes."2
This "expanding pie" method, however, ignores economic reality."'
Educational institutions, like other organized entities, face finite
budgets and must meet their desired goals within these budgets.
Educational institutions are highly unlikely to increase their athletic
budgets to meet substantial proportionality. 2  Instead, institutions
are more likely to eliminate opportunities for male students or
transfer them to female students."S
Despite Congressional oversight and the threat of legislative
intervention, the unintended consequences created by Cohen's
application of the three-part test have continued after the publication
of the Clarification. These unintended consequences continue to
harm educational institutions in general, 5 6 and athletic departments
248. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 764 & n.159.
249. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 764 & n.159.
250. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 764 & n.159 (asserting that, for example, OCR's
assumption that men and women share the same level of interest in sports is questionable).
251. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 765.
252. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 765 (arguing that the Clarification assumes that
institutions will be able to supply the necessary opportunities to satisfy substantial
proportionality); Welch Suggs, Colleges ConsiderFairness of Cutting Men's Teams to Comply with Title
a4 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 19, 1999, at A53 (quoting Donna Lopiano, Executive
Director, Women's Sports Foundation, as saying that the "easiest solution is [for an institution]
to double [its] resources and give the women the same opportunities as men").
253. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 765.
254. Weistart, supra note 18, at 200.
255. Weistart, supra note 18, at 200.
256. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 298-306 (arguing that the "profit center" theory of college
sports utilizes college sports as a vehicle for the institution to make money). Accordingly, calls
for cutbacks of the funding of revenue-producing sports threaten to diminish the amount of
revenue produced by these sports. Cf Porto, supra note 10, at 384-88 (stating that successful
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in particular.27 Moreover, men's nonrevenue-producing sports, the
core of the United States Olympic Team, may have already been
irreparably harmed by numerous athletic program cutbacks initiated
in the name of Title IX compliance.ts Clearly, modification is
necessary to restore fairness and common sense.
III. THE NEED TO MODIFY TITLE IX TO BETTER APPLY TO
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Title IX's prohibition against gender discrimination in educational
programss 9 undeniably serves a legitimate purpose that should be
supported. Unfortunately, the application of Title IX to
intercollegiate athletics has created a hostile environment that is ill-
suited to further this legislative purpose .2 °  By not resolving the
factors that led to Title IX's unintended consequences, a battle for
scarce athletic resources has arisen among revenue and nonrevenue-
producing sports and men's and women's athletic programs.
To end this competition for resources, two problems created by
Cohen's application of the three-part test must be addressed. First,
enforcement of Title IX through substantial proportionality's quota
system must be recognized as legally impermissible. Second, the
three-part test must take into consideration structural differences
between men's and women's athletics teams and the various
athletic teams do not financially benefit the colleges they represent).
257. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 257 (noting that the mandate for institutions to comply
with Title IX has generated fears that the financial stability of college athletics will be adversely
affected by cutbacks of revenue-producing sports); EADA Reports, supra note 135 (reporting
the economic earnings of NCAA Division I athletic and football programs during the 1995-96
and 1996-97 academic years). The economic earnings reported by the Chronicle of Higher
Education survey appear to support the fear that altering the operating standards for football
would have a direct effect on the financial health of the entire athletic program. Of the 45
NCAA Division I institutions reporting that their athletic program did not suffer a financial loss
during the 1995-96 academic year, 36 of these institutions reported a profit by their football
program. EADA Reports, supra note 135. During the 1996-97 academic year, 70 of the 96
institutions not reporting a financial loss also reported a profit by their football program.
EADA Reports, supra note 135.
258. See Shook, supra note 230, at 774 (stating that men's nonrevenue-producing sports have
become increasingly endangered and extinct as institutions attempt to comply with the Cohen
interpretation of the three-part test).
259. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994). In pertinent part, § 1681 (a) states that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." Id.
260. See Weistart, supra note 18, at 194-95 (observing that the pursuit of limited resources
for the funding of athletic opportunities has created a "them vs. us," "men vs. women'-type of
rivalry that encourages a highly defensive and suspicious atmosphere, which is not conducive to
reaching a viable solution to the Title IX problem).
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competitive goals of institutions-particularly in operating revenue-
producing sports.6
A. Substantial Proportionality: An Impermissible Determinative Standard
Substantial proportionality gained prominence as the enforcement
mechanism for Title IX due to its simplicity and efficiency in
administration. However, any benefit provided by substantial
proportionality is outweighed by the corresponding loss of equity and
fairness. In addition, legal support for substantial proportionality
does not exist for at least three reasons. First, although the legislative
history of Title IX is generally ambiguous,26 Congress explicitly forbid
the use of quotas, statistical balancing, and reverse discrimination to
implement Title IX.26s Accordingly, the plain text of the substantial
proportionality prong, as well as Cohen's application of the entire
three-part test, does not carry legal weight because it directly
contradicts Congress' legislative intent.2 4  Secondly, Cohen's
application of the three-part test violates the Equal Protection
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in two recent cases:
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 25 and United States v. Virginia.6
Finally, substantial proportionality's implicit assumption regarding
the relative interests and abilities of each sex to compete in
intercollegiate athletics has never been substantiated, and is,
261. See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 24, at 846 (noting that the courts have ignored
both the Javitz Amendment and OCR's determination that the unique nature of the sport
should be examined before assessing Title IX compliance); see also Daniel, supra note 27, at 293
(noting that Title IX's assumption that athletic programs are merely an extension of the
university's educational efforts does not accurately reflect the complexities and forms that an
intercollegiate athletic program may take). The ramification of treating all sports equally is that
institutions will choose to retain those athletic programs that are most valuable to the
institution, i.e., men's revenue-producing teams, and eliminate other opportunities for male
athletes in order to satisfy the substantial proportionality prong. Daniel, supra note 27, at 293.
262. See infra Part Il1.A (analyzing the legislative treatment of quotas during the Title IX
debate).
263. See, eg., Aronberg, supra note 12, at 748-51 (outlining numerous statements of
legislative intent and efforts by Congress to prohibit the use of quotas, affirmative action, and
reverse discrimination to achieve Tite IX's goals); Mahoney, supra note 22, at 945 (observing
that the legislative history of Title IX is "replete with comments" from members of Congress
that the Act would not require a quota system); Bernardo, supra note 97, at 341 (stating that the
statistical balancing of opportunities runs contrary to the explicit text of § 1681(b), which
prohibits the use of quotas to prohibit sex discrimination); Leahy, supra note 40, at 530-31
(arguing that the substantial proportionality prong is contrary to the legislative history of the
statute, which clearly eliminated statistical balancing as a required method for Title IX
compliance).
264. Aronberg, supra note 12, at 748-51.
265. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), vacating and remanding 16 F.3d 1537 (10th Cir. 1994), affg790
F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1992).
266. 852 F. Supp. 471 (W.D. Va. 1994), afftd, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995), reh'g denied, 52
F.3d 90 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
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therefore, legally unjustifiable for enforcing substantial
proportionality.
1. Title IX's Legislative History and Plain Text Forbid Substantial
Proportionality to Test Compliance
In Cohen, the court granted substantial deference to the Policy
Interpretation, holding that it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."267 In doing so, the court applied
the three-part test in a manner that required institutions to ultimately
achieve substantial proportionality.26s However, Cohen's deference to
the Policy Interpretation is erroneous because the substantial
proportionality prong and the court's entire application of the three-
part test is inconsistent with Tide IX. Both the Act's legislative history
and its plain language clearly prohibit using quotas, statistical
balancing of the sexes, and reverse discrimination to remedy sex
discrimination in educational institutions. 69
Congress was aware during the debate of the Tite IX measures that
quotas might be used to implement Title IX in the absence of a clear
legislative statement against their useY.2 0  Accordingly, Congress
debated the use of quotas at length.271 For example, during debate of
the 1971 Senate bill, Senator Bayh faced strong concerns that Title IX
require educational institutions to maintain sex-based quotas.272 To
address this concern, Senator Bayh explicitly stated that Title IX
intended to do away with all sex-based quotas in determining
273educational opportunities.
267. See Cohen , 101 F.3d 155, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing the standard set by the Court in
Chevron). While the decision in Chevron concerned whether an agency's regulations were
constitutionally valid, the Court in Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144 (1991), applied the same standard to an agency's construction of its own regulations.
Id. at 150.
268. See Cohen It, 101 F.3d at 170 (stating that Cohen pushes substantial proportionality).
269, See generally 117 CONG. REc. 30,406-09 (1971); 117 CONG. REc. 39,261-62 (1971); 118
CONG. REc. 5813 (1972); 118 CONG. REc. 18,437-38 (1972).
270. Id.
271. Id
272. 117 CONG. REC. at 30,406-11 (addressing concerns that the bill would require the
establishment of sex-based ratios in educational institutions).
273. See i&, at 30,406 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (confirming that the use of quotas by
educational institutions was precisely "the very thing this amendment is trying to prohibit"); see
also id at 30,409 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(reemphasizing that "the amendment is not designed to require specific
quotas .... The basis for determining compliance would not be an arbitrary
ratio .... Let me emphasize again that we are not requiring quotas .... What we
are saying is that we are striking down quotas. The thrust of the amendment is to
do away with every quota.").
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To eliminate any concern that quotas would be required,
Representative Albert Quie sponsored an amendment to the House
Title IX measure that prohibited educational institutions from
"grant[ing] preferential or disparate treatment to the members of
one sex" when an historic disparity of educational opportunity
existed between the two sexes at the institution.27 4 Representative
Quie clearly stated that the purpose of the amendment would be to
provide that there shall be no quotas in this sex anti-discrimination
tile .... To make it absolutely certain there will not be a
requirement of quotas in the graduate institutions and
employment in institutions of higher education similar to the
prohibition against preferential treatment of minorities under the
Civil Rights Act. I believe this legislation is necessary.2
75
Following the introduction of the Quie amendment,
Representative Green, the House sponsor of the Title IX measure
and the Chairman of the 1970 House hearings, gave her support for
the Quie anti-quota amendmentY.27  Representative Green stated that
she was "opposed to quotas .... To my way of thinking a quota
system would hurt our colleges and universities. I am opposed to it
even in terms of attempting to end discrimination on the basis of
sex."277  Shortly thereafter, the Quie anti-quota amendment was
agreed to by the House Committee on Education and Labor.Y
Although both the 1971 House and Senate Title IX measures were
rejected for being nongermane to the proposed bill, 9 these
statements illustrate Congress' unambiguous intent to prohibit
Senator Bayh debated with Senator Peter Dominick extensively regarding what kind of quotas,
if any, would be appropriate for educational institutions to implement to maintain an ideal
gender balance. Id at 30,406-08. Repeatedly, Senator Bayh stated that he would be against the
Act requiring any imposition of quotas. Id.
274. 117 CONG. REc. 39,261 (1971) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b)). Representative
Quie's amendment reads in pertinent part:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require
any educational institutional [sic] to grant preferential treatment or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating
in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in
comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any
community, State, section, or other area ....
Id.
275. 117 CONG. REC. 39,261-62 (1971) (statement of Rep. Quie).
276. 117 CONG. REc. 39,262 (1971) (statement of Rep. Green).
277. Id.
278. See id. (roll call vote on the Quie amendment).
279. See Aronberg, supra note 12, at 748 (stating that the Green and Bayh amendments to
the Education Amendments of 1971 were rejected in the Senate as nongermane to the bill); see
also 118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that the Senate rejected the
Bayh Amendment as nongermane to the 1971 Educational Act Amendments).
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quotas from Title IX enforcement. In addition, the Quie anti-quota
amendment was later included in the 1972 Title IX measure and
enacted into law.80
Following the re-introduction of the Title IX measures in 1972,
concern again arose that quotas would be used to enforce the Act's
provisions. Once more, Senator Bayh insisted that, similar to his
1971 measure, the 1972 Title IX bill neither required nor established
quotas. 2 2 Following the introduction of the measure, Senator John
Beall agreed that quotas should not be used to enforce Tide IX28 3 In
denouncing the use of quotas, Senator Beall directly addressed the
problem of reverse discrimination, arguing that Title IX is not
intended to be affirmative action legislation that would require
statistical balancing of the sexes.284 Senator Bayh added "that [the]
amendment [sic] does not require a 3 percent or a 55 percent
balance. ''2s
To further underscore Congress' disapproval of quotas, the Senate
reprinted a letter from Julian H. Levi of the University of Chicago
and a written response from Senator Bayh in the record of the Senate
debate.8 Mr. Levi's letter stated that:
This is always a temptation in these matters for examining agents to
turn to a statistical report and then, purely on the basis of
percentages, to thrust the burden upon the institution. This has
280. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994).
281. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 945 (observing that the legislative history is replete with
Congressional comments concerned with quotas).
282. See 118 CONG. REC. 5812 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that the amendment
sets no quota, but only requires providing an equal opportunity).
283. See id at 5813 (statement of Sen. Beall) (stating his hope that the amendment would
only require that people would be treated equally and fairly in the requirements for admission
to educational institutions or employment); see also 118 CONG. REc. 5812 (1972) (statement of
Sen. Beall) (acknowledging that, at the time of the debate, quota systems were used against
women in higher educational institution admissions).
284. See 118 CONG. REC. 5813 (1972) (statement of Sen. Beall) (indicating that support for
the amendment would not be given if statistical balancing would be required); see also Mahoney,
supra note 22, at 947-48 (quoting Sen. Beall's statement to the Senate). Senator Beall hoped it
,was
the intent of the Senate in adopting the amendment that we are desirous of
eliminating the sex discrimination that has taken place in education. As we eliminate
this, I hope that what we are not establishing is that we want everyone to be treated
fairly and equally so far as the requirements for admission or employment are
concerned. We do not answer that by saying that we want to have the faculty
composed 50 percent of women and 50 percent of men.
118 CONG. REC. 5813 (1972) (statement of Sen. Beall).
285. 118 CONG. REc. 5813 (1972) (statement of Sen. Beall) (emphasizing that Title IX is not
intended to be affirmative action legislation for the purpose of requiring a statistical balance of
the sexes).
286. Id- at 18,437-48 (1972).
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resulted in some places responding somewhat akin to the
reasoning in the busing cases, that past discrepancies now justify
reverse discrimination. Thus, some of us are now in receipt of
letters from other institutions asking not that we suggest candidates
for faculty appointment without discrimination, but rather
2871
confining the inquiry to either women or Blacks.
Senator Bayh responded to Mr. Levi's concern by concluding that
§ 1681(b), which incorporated the Quie anti-quota amendment in
the House bill, specified that
the legislation would not require specific quotas. I did not include
such a provision as part of the Senate amendment because I believe
that my amendment already states clearly that no person, male or
female, shall be subjected to discrimination. The language of my
amendment does not require reverse discrimination.
Following the submission of both letters into the record, Senator
Claiborne Pell stated that the clear message from this written
exchange was that the proposed amendment "must be sure that this
type of amendment is not used to establish quotas for sex .... In the
past, quotas have been used to bar admissions at some of the better
schools of our country. I would not like to see them reinstituted in
the name of fairness."
28 9
These passages clearly establish Congress' unwillingness to enact
Title IX if it could require gender quotas for admission to
undergraduate universities. This broad reservation against the use of
quotas necessarily prohibits sex-based quotas, including
proportionality, to determine access to athletic opportunities. 0
While the substantial proportionality prong of the three-part test does
not proscribe a specific number of athletic opportunities for women
athletes that an institution must provide, it nonetheless establishes an
arbitrary quota for the proportion of women athletes within an
institution's athletic program.2"
The First Circuit in Cohen llsidestepped Title IX's legislative history
when it rejected Brown's argument that the three-part test itself, or at
least the district court's application of it, imposed an impermissible
quota. Chastising Brown for resorting to inflammatory and
287. Id. at 18,437.
288. Id. (emphasis added).
289. Ia. at 18,438.
290. See Leahy, supra note 40, at 529-30 (arguing that the substantial proportionality prong
requires the imposition of a quota in allocating athletic opportunities, which is clearly contrary
to the Act's legislative history).
291. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 944 (stating that substantial proportionality establishes a
quota system, despite the arguments of Tite IX supporters).
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"talismanic" terms, the First Circuit held that the case did not present
issues that fit under the narrow legal definition of affirmative
action.12 Rationalizing that the three-part test and the district court's
application of it provided institutions with three separate methods to
comply with the Act, the court held that nothing in the Policy
Interpretation "mandates gender-based preferences or quotas."29s The
court also stated, similar to the Clarification, that the three-part test
was entirely consistent with the Quie anti-quota amendment codified
in § 1681 (b) because the test did not "require preferential or disparate
treatment.",
4
In his dissent in Cohen II, ChiefJudge Torruella rebuked the court
for its strict definition analysis of Brown's argument. The dissent
correctly focused its attention on whether the characteristics that
made quotas impermissible existed in this case, finding them
"present here in spades."25 Addressing the court's "mandates" and
"requires" arguments, the dissent found no logical reason to support
the court's conclusion.296 Not only did the dissent find that the
substantial proportionality prong necessarily required statistical
balancing, but also that the other two prongs, as applied by the court,
served as surrogates for statistical balancing.297 For the dissent, the
three-part test directly contradicted the Act's legislative intent, even
though the test did not specifically set or mention a quota, because
the three-part test had a quota-setting effect.
25
2. Adarand and Virginia. The Supreme Court Raises the Standard of
Scrutiny
Between the district court's decision in Cohen IH and the First
Circuit's affirmation, the Supreme Court heard two cases that cast
significant doubt on Cohen's application of the three-part test and
substantial proportionality. In 1995, the Supreme Court held in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena that strict scrutiny was the
appropriate standard of review for all race based classifications, even
those deemed to be "benign. " 2  The Court recognized that
292. Cohen I, 101 FSd at 170.
293. I (emphasis added).
294. 1&, at 175 (emphasis added); Cantu, supra note 230, at 3-4 (stating that the "OCR does
not require quotas").
295. Cohen!f, 101 F.3d at 195.
296. Id at 196.
297. 1&t
298. a at 195.
299. Adaran, 500 U.S. at 225-29.
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maintaining different standards for benign and discriminatory
classifications would leave courts with the difficult task of
determining whether a "so-called preference is in fact benign. '
Thus, the Court held that the courts should be precluded from
lowering their standard of scrutiny for purportedly benign
classifications even in race-based affirmative action cases, finding that
consistency is served only once the courts realize that "any individual
suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the government
because of his or her race, whatever that race may be."3 1
However, Adarand left open whether strict scrutiny would also
apply to cases involving gender-based classifications. 2 In 1996, in
United States v. Virginia, the Court was presented with the opportunity
to answer this question when the United States sued the
Commonwealth of Virginia to admit women students to the then all-
male Virginia Military Institute (VMI). s ' Following two previous
defeats in lower courts, the Clinton Administration increased the
stakes involved by imploring the Supreme Court to extend strict
scrutiny to gender-based classifications."s4 While the Court did not
explicitly adopt the government's argument, it did raise the standard
of review to a higher level than intermediate scrutiny. In the Court's
opinion, parties who seek to defend gender-based government action
must demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that
action.3'5  Simply meeting traditional intermediate scrutiny-
demonstrating an important government interest and means
substantially related to achieving that goal-was not enough.
United States v. Virginia, though, may have actually extended strict
scrutiny to gender-based classifications. In his dissenting opinion,
Justice Scalia argued that the Court effectively adopted the
government's plea for strict scrutiny review, despite making no
reference to it in its opinion.0 6 Justice Scalia concluded that the new
"exceedingly persuasive justification" was virtually "indistinguishable
300. Id. at 226 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,298 (1978)).
301. Id. at 230.
302. See id at 247 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that unless strict scrutiny was also
extended to gender-based classifications, government affirmative action programs would be
more difficult to enforce for blacks than for women, even though the Equal Protection Clause
was primarily designed to end discrimination against blacks).
303. 518 U.S. 515, 523 (1996).
304. Jeffrey Rosen, Separate But Equal at VM: Like Race, Like Gender?, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 19,
1996, at 26-27.
305. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
306. Id. at 571 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
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from strict scrutiny.""7
Under the new "exceedingly persuasive justification" standard,
Cohen's application of the three-part test, as well as the three-part test
itself, is likely prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. Although
the First Circuit in Cohen it° stated that Adarand and Virginia did not
affect its review of the district court's opinion under the "law of the
case" doctrine, 9 ChiefJudge Torruella argued in his dissent that the
First Circuit erred in not considering the effect of these holdings.3 0
Observing that the standard of review had changed since the First
Circuit's previous opinion in Cohen I, the dissent stated that the law of
the case doctrine was improperly applied because Cohen I applied "a
lenient version of intermediate scrutiny" in violation of Adarand and
"because it did not apply the 'exceedingly persuasive justification' test
of Virginia."311
Thus, because Cohen H did not follow the Supreme Court's
holdings that raised the standard for Equal Protection review of
gender-based classifications, subsequent courts should not grant
Cohen and its progeny significant legal weight.
3. Substantial Proportionality's Incorrect Underlying Assumption
Even if the three-part test did not ignore the Act's legislative history
and plain text-and the Supreme Court did not heighten the
standard for review of gender-based classifications-Cohen's
application of the three-part test is still an inaccurate method to
determine Title IX compliance. In order for Cohen's application of
the three-part test to effectively gauge Title IX compliance,
substantial proportionality's implicit assumption-that each sex has
the same interest and ability to compete in intercollegiate athletics, at
every institution-must be valid.3 ' While this assumption has never
been proven, Cohen and its progeny nonetheless adopted it without
question.3 ' s Yet, basic logic and common sense argue against its
validity.
314
307. Id. at 596 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
308. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
309. Id. at 162.
310. Id at 188-92 (Torruela, C.J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 191 (Torruela, CJ., dissenting).
312. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913 (M.D. La. 1996).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 913-14 (calling Cohen's interpretation of substantial proportionality into doubt
and stating that it is "more logical that interest in participation and levels of ability to
participate as percentages of the male and female populations will vary from campus to campus
and region to region and will change with time").
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First, it is unlikely that male and female college students have
identical interests and abilities to participate in intercollegiate
athletics. Title IX proponents argue that the dramatic increase in the
number of women athletes since the enactment of Title IX
demonstrates that the interests and abilities of women are equal to
those of men 5 In 1971, only 294,015 women athletes participated in
high school sports.3 That number increased to over 1.8 million in
1989-90, and over 2.4 million in 1996-97. '1 The number of women
athletes in NCAA institutions also increased from over 91,000 in
1984-85 to almost 124,000 in 1995-96.3'8 These supporters argue that,
given proper support and a non-discriminatory environment, the
proportion of women athletes within an institution's athletic program
would be equal to that of male athletes. 9
Yet, ample evidence exists that women students are presently not as
interested in participating in intercollegiate athletics as male
students. 9 In Cohen, Brown University produced evidence that eight
times as many male students participated in its intramural program,
which does not require any prerequisite skill level to participate.
Nationally, Brown reported, four times as many men participate in
intramural programs.s Men also continue to compete in athletics at
all levels of competition in far greater numbers than women. For
example, during the 1995-96 academic year, 75,000 more male
athletes competed in intercollegiate athletics than female athletes,
and 1.2 million more competed in interscholastic athletics.
23
Furthermore, despite the impressive growth of women's athletic
opportunities, the proportion of women among intercollegiate
315. See Spitz, supra note 3, at 648-49 (citing the growth of numerous women's athletic
teams as evidence that unmet athletic interests are being satisfied following the enforcement of
Title IX).
316. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11.
317. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11.
318. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11. In addition, over 18,000 women athletes competed
intercollegiately at National Amateur Intercollegiate Association ("NAIA") institutions, and
almost 15,000 at NationalJunior College Athletic Association ("NJCAA") institutions in 1995-96.
Curtis & Grant, supra note 11.
319. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 26 (noting that the Cohen, Roberts, and Favia
courts held that participation opportunities should substantially mirror the proportion of each
sex within an institution's student body). In other words, if women represent 50% of the
student body, then women should generally represent 50% of an institution's athletes. Id.
320. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 29 (discussing the types of evidence available
that indicate men are more interested in athletics than women).
321. Appellant's Brief in Appeal from the District Court at 7, Cohen HI, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir.
1996).
322. Irdat7n.1O.
323. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11.
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athletes has not changed much since 1979.4 In fact, the overall
athletic interests of women athletes appears to be adequately met by
intercollegiate athletic programs.32 Women athletes currently
represent more than thirty-nine percent of high school athletes and
over thirty-eight percent of intercollegiate athletes. 6 The substantial
similarity between the proportion of women athletes in
intercollegiate and interscholastic athletics, the primary supplier of
athletics for intercollegiate athletics, suggests that intercollegiate
athletic programs reflect the athletic interests and abilities of their
women students.27
Secondly, even if each sex was equally interested and qualified for
intercollegiate athletic competition, there is simply no evidence that
equal competitive interest would be reflected in the student body of
every institution offering intercollegiate athletics. Just as the student
body of a particular institution tends to reflect its unique character,
the athletic interests of student bodies will also differ from institution
to institution. Substantial proportionality disregards this difference.
In effect, OCR and the federal courts ignored the relationship
between the institution's emphasis on athletics and the athletic
interests of its prospective and current students in favor of substantial
proportionality's expediency.
B. OCR Regulations Disregard Key Structural Differences Among Athletic
Programs and Institutions
In addition to substantial proportionality's negative effects, Cohen's
application of the three-part test is flawed because it is inherently
incapable of determining equal athletic opportunity. Advocates of
the three-part test argue that it provides institutions with a flexible
and malleable standard for Title IX compliance.2 8 These advocates
324. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4. During the 1996-97 academic year, women athletes
represented nearly 39% of all intercollegiate athletes, approximately the same proportion as
they did in 1979; see also Aronberg, supra note 12, at 766-68 (noting that the proportion of
women athletes in college athletics only rose 3% between 1979 and 1992, rising from 33% to
nearly 36%).
325. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 28 (stating that the proportion of women in
intercollegiate athletics appears to meet the athletic interests of women athletes because the
proportion of women intercollegiate athletes is significantly similar to the proportion of women
interscholastic athletes, the primary feeder pool for intercollegiate athletics).
326. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11. However, the National Women's Sports Foundation has
determined through a survey of 767 of 902 NCAA Division I, II, and III schools that women
athletes represent 37% of all intercollegiate athletes. Curtis & Grant, supra note 11.
327. See Bemardo, supra note 97, at 353 (noting that male athletes comprised 61% of all
high school student athletes and 66% of all college student athletes, while women athletes
comprised 39% and 34% of high school and college student athletes, respectively).
328. See CLARIFICATION, supra note 98 (stating that the three-part test provides institutions
20001
334 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAw [Vol. 8:2
suggest that the three-part test can be applied to all institutions,
regardless of the athletic program's competitive level, athletic budget,
or sponsored athletic teams because institutions need only meet one
of three different prongs.m Additionally, advocates of the three-part
test accept its implicit rationale that institutions should not weigh the
extrinsic benefits of intercollegiate athletic activities, such as
promoting the institution or generating revenue,"" but should
instead view each athletic activity as equally valuable."3 '
Unfortunately, due to the different structures of men's and women's
athletic activities, and the inherent differences between NCAA
Division I, II, and Il athletic programs, " ' the three-prong test does
not provide sufficient flexibility to optimally manage athletic
333
programs.
First, one test cannot fairly evaluate equal opportunity to
participate for both sexes because men's and women's athletic
programs are significantly different from one another. The three-
part test erroneously assumes that men's and women's athletic teams
are sufficiently similar to each other such that comparing the
proportion of participants from each sex is an accurate measure of
Title IX compliance.3 4 However, this assumption is flawed in several
ways. For example, men's athletic teams generally have larger squad
with three standards to choose from in meeting Title IX requirements).
329. See Cantu, supra note 230, at 3-4 (arguing that the three-part test provides three
separate methods to comply with Title IX); Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 90 (arguing that
the large size of a football team does not make compliance with Title IX an insurmountable
task; rather, institutions can meet either the second or third prongs of the three-part test to
comply with Title IX).
330. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 298-305 (noting the capability of revenue-producing sports
to generate revenue and notoriety for the institution).
331. See Brake & Caitlin, supra note 59, at 90 (suggesting that Congress' rejection of the
Javitz Amendment indicates that Congress did not intend Title IX to treat revenue-producing
sports differently).
332. NCAA divides intercollegiate athletics into three divisions. GAO REPORT, Supra note
11, at 5. Division I is the highest level of intercollegiate competition and institutions are
required to sponsor the greatest number of sports and provide the most athletic scholarships.
Both Division II & III athletic programs perform at a lower level of competition, but are not
required to provide as many athletic scholarships or teams as Division I. In fact, Division III
institutions do not give any athletic scholarships.
333. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 259 (arguing that the three-part test does not adequately
distinguish between revenue and non-revenue producing sports); Davidson & Kerr, supra note
208, at 27 (noting that the three-prong test does not properly address the large number of
players needed for football teams).
334. See Football Coaches Take Aim at Title IX USA TODAY, Jan. 12, 1995, at 4C (reporting
American Football Coaches Association's ("AFCA") position on Tide IX). The AFCA maintains
that the proportionality test strictly applied "could lead to a school being found in violation
even if the school offers the same sports to men and to women, but fewer women choose to
participate than men." Id Cf Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 89-90 (dismissing the validity of
treating football different than any other sport).
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sizes than women's athletic teams.3 5 To comply with substantial
proportionality, an institution must do at least one of three things:
increase the squad size for every women's athletic team while
decreasing the squad size for every men's athletic team, sponsor more
women's athletic teams,36 or eliminate men's athletic teams.3 7 All of
these options discriminately affect male athletes. If an institution
increases the size of each women's athletic squad to exceed the
natural squad size for that sport, the interests of women athletes are
accommodated to a greater extent than their male counterparts. 
33
Similarly, if the number of women's teams is increased, the interests
of women athletes are better served because the women's athletic
program would sponsor a more diverse selection of competitive
sports than the men's program. Finally, reducing the size or quantity
of men's athletic teams dearly harms male athletes because
participation opportunities are then eliminated solely on the basis of
339
sex.
In addition, the presence of teams offered for only one sex, such as
men's football or women's field hockey, makes the three-part test's
gender equity equation infinitely more difficult. In particular, the
larger squad size of men's football teams makes it nearly impossible
for an institution to satisfy the three-part test without drastically
limiting the number of other men's athletic teams it sponsors.34  The
typical men's football team is four to five times the size of a typical
335. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 27 (stating that several factors contribute to the
larger squad size of men's athletic teams, including the necessity of larger squad sizes for male
athletic teams for physical contact sports in order to remain competitive following athletic
injuries); Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 92 (stating that proponents assert that men exhibit a
greater interest in intercollegiate competition than do women); cf id. (noting that even in
women's athletic activities that have an equivalent male athletic activity, such as softball and
baseball, inherent differences between the activities require larger squad sizes for some men's
athletic teams).
336. See Mike Recht, U.N.H. Plans Full Gender Equity in '98, VALLEY NEWS, June 22, 1997, at
B3 (reporting that the University of New Hampshire (UNH) announced a plan to achieve
gender equity in athletics during the 1997-98 academic year by reducing the number of men's
teams in order to meet substantial proportionality). In its plan, UNH announced that it would
offer men five sports-ice hockey, basketball, skiing, soccer, and football-while women
athletes would participate in eleven sports-ice hockey, basketball, volleyball, soccer, field
hockey, lacrosse, swimming, cross country/track, skiing, crew, and tennis. Id
337. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 30 (arguing that the three-part test forces
institutions to select one of these choices in order to be Title IX compliant).
338. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 30 ("[T]hese additions and subtractions are not
only arbitrary, but are in themselves discriminatory and contrary to the intent of Title IX.").
339. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 29-30 (arguing that reducing athletic
opportunities for male athletes to satisfy Title IX is discriminatory).
340. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 27 (noting that the size of the average men's
football team is four to five times the size of the average women's athletic team). Thus, in order
to satisfy substantial proportionality, an athletic program with a football team must provide five
women's sports teams before they may provide another men's team.
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women's athletic team, and, therefore, an institution must offer at
least four women's sports to equal the number of participation
opportunities provided by men's football alone.3 ' Title IX advocates
disregard the effect this has on an athletic program's efforts to
comply with Tide IX, arguing that athletic programs must provide
whatever resources and create as many women's athletic teams as it
takes to comply with the three-part test.34 2 However, this argument
ignores economic reality. Athletic programs have finite budgets and
can only fund as many teams and athletic opportunities as their
budgets provide.343 As a result, institutions that offer intercollegiate
football are forced to reduce the number of men's athletic teams,
creating a disproportionate gap in the diversity of athletic teams
offered for each sex, to reach substantial proportionality under
Cohen.
Second, Cohen's application of the three-part test does not
effectively accommodate the different competitive goals and financial
commitments of individual athletic programs."' NCAA athletic
programs operate at different levels of competition and funding, and
are accordingly divided into Division I, H, or III.M6 Division I is the
highest level of intercollegiate athletic competition, offering
institutions the greatest potential for television exposure and
revenue.37  Not surprisingly, Division I athletic programs have
different goals than Division II and III athletic programs, which do
not provide the necessary resources to compete at the Division I
level. s Typically, Division II and III athletic programs epitomize the
amateur model of college sports,s 9 while Division I athletic programs
include some sports that operate purely to provide a source of
341. Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 27.
342. See Recht, supra note 336, at B3 (describing the example set by the University of New
Hampshire).
343. Recht, supra note 336, at B3.
344. Recht, supra note 336, at B3.
345. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 259 (complaining that the three-part test fails to recognize
the revenue generating ability of certain sports, treating all intercollegiate sports as educational
opportunities).
346. In addition, an institution's Division I football program may be either Division I-A or I-
AA, depending on the number of scholarships that the institution is allowed to provide for its
football program.
347. See Davidson & Kerr, supra note 208, at 44 n.100 (noting that Division I institutions
must provide seven varsity sports).
348. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 293-306 (disagreeing with the contention that there is one
true model of a college athletic program, distinguishing between the "amateur model" and the
"profit center model").
349. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 295-98 (discussing the amateur model of college athletics).
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revenue and promote the institution's prominence."' Yet the three-
part test disregards these different goals because it does not consider
an institution's level of athletic competition when determining Title
IX compliance.35'
The three-part test also does not consider a sport's economic costs
and benefits, or the economic function of the athletic program, in
evaluating Title IX compliance.52 While it is a general rule that
intercollegiate athletic programs lose money,"' some athletic
programs are able to profit from revenue generated from select
sports." These revenue-producing sports-typically men's basketball
and football-are able to recover their operating costs through
outside revenue. Some revenue-producing sports even generate
enough revenue to support the entire athletic program and to
provide a profit for the institution.55 Prominent athletic programs
eagerly support revenue-producing sports teams as a way to recover
increasing athletic program costs, including the cost of creating new
women's athletic teams needed for Title IX compliance.56 As the
three-part test is applied, special considerations are not made for the
unique role of revenue-producing sports.357  Because revenue-
producing sports provide institutions with financial and promotional
benefits,353 they should be examined differently under Title IX.
Title IX supporters are particularly critical of special treatment for
revenue-producing sports, arguing that once special treatment is
350. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 293-306 (comparing the profit center theory of college
athletics to the amateur model).
351. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 295.
352. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 295.
353. See EADA Reports, supra note 135 (providing the amount of revenue produced by each
reporting school's men's and women's athletic programs, as well as revenue generated by men's
football). For example, during the 1996-97 academic year, over 68% of all reporting athletic
departments lost money. Id. However, only 62.75% of men's athletic programs lost money,
compared to over 92% of all women's athletic programs. Id.
354. EADA Reports, supra note 135. For example, during the 1996-97 academic year, the
University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa made a profit of over $8 million from its athletic program.
Id. Most of this profit can be traced to the success of the men's athletic program, which
produced an overall profit of $13,192,000. Id This figure is almost entirely accounted for by
the profit generated by Alabama's men's football program, which generated a gross profit of
over $21.4 million and a net profit of over $13 million. Id.
355. See, e.g., EADA Reports, supra note 135.
356. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 90 (noting the reluctance to tamper with revenue-
producing sports, like football).
357. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 90 (disregarding the arguments from football
supporters that special treatment is necessary); see also Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-380, § 844, 1974 U.S.C.CAN. (88 Stat.) 695 (setting forth theJavitz Amendment).
358. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 298-306 (summarizing the benefits revenue-producing
sports provide an institution).
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granted, institutions will excessively fund men's football and
basketball programs while women's and men's non-revenue sports
will remain severely under-funded. There is some support for this
conclusion. Nearly seventy percent of all Division I-A, and almost all
Division I-AA and II, football programs lose money.59 Some studies
also argue that athletic programs fund revenue-producing sports as if
in an "athletics arms race," funding revenue-producing sports at an
increasingly higher level than competing institutions in an effort to
obtain the highest amount of profit.s6" Additionally, Title IX
supporters argue that Congress' rejection of the Tower Amendment
indicates that revenue-producing sports should be similarly treated in
determining Title IX compliance."' 1
However, data gathered in 1996 and 1997 under the EADA does
not support this bleak picture of revenue-producing sports. More
than forty percent of Division I football programs generate revenue,
and, in some cases, the amount of revenue is substantial. 62 Moreover,
there is a high correlation between the profitability of an institution's
football program and the profitability of the athletic program as a
whole."" On the other hand, more than ninety-one percent of all
Division I women's athletic programs lost money.6" Clearly, the
profit generated by revenue-producing sports is vital to the
promotion and development of women's athletics and the athletic
program as a whole.ss Without these profits, the number of athletic
359. See Porto, supra note 10, at 385 (finding that almost 30 of 103 Division I-A football
programs generate revenue; the rest barely break even). Other reports find that more than
44% of all Division I football programs turn a profit or break even. See EADA Reports, supra
note 135 (finding that 94 of the 212 (44.34%) Division I football programs, responding to the
Chronicle of HigherEducation survey during the 1996-97 academic year, either reported a profit or
no financial loss).
360. See Harry Edwards, The Collegiate Aras Race: Origins and Implications of the "Rule 48"
Controversy, 8J. SPORT & Soc. ISSUEs 4, 7 (1984) (describing the increasing athletic budgets of
certain teams hoping to outspend their competitors in order to achieve better competitive
results as the "athletic arms race").
361. See Brake & Catlin, supra note 59, at 90 (suggesting that the rejection of the Tower
Amendment precludes different treatment of revenue-producing sports).
362. See EADA Reports, supra note 135 (reporting that 44.34% of all reporting Division I
men's football teams made a profit or reported no financial losses during the 1996-97 academic
year). Moreover, some football programs generate substantial revenue. For example, the
University of Michigan made a net profit of over $12 million dollars from its men's football
team, and Ohio State University made a net profit of over $14 million. Id.
363. EADA Reports, supra note 135. Daring the 1995-96 academic year, 36 of the 45 (80%)
athletic programs reporting that they had not suffered a financial loss, also reported a profit by
their football program. In 1996-97, 70 of the 96 (72.92%) athletic programs reported the same
results. Id.
364. See EADA Reports, supra note 135 (stating that during the 1996-97 academic year,
8.74% of Division I women's athletic programs reported that they had not suffered a financial
loss).
365. See 120 CONG. REG. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (arguing that the revenue
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opportunities for all athletes would be severely diminished by budget
constraints.
Furthermore, special treatment of revenue-producing sports does
not contradict Congress' rejection of the Tower Amendment. While
the Tower Amendment explicitly granted special treatment to
revenue-producing sports, the Javitz Amendment instructed OCR to
consider the unique characteristics of all sports. 66 While revenue-
producing sports were not explicitly mentioned as they were in the
Tower Amendment, strong policy considerations warrant special
treatment for these sports-particularly football. 67 The large team
size required for football distorts any numeric evaluation of the equal
opportunity to participate because it inevitably produces a finding of
disproportionality. 3ss Moreover, the economic function of revenue-
producing sports should be considered a unique characteristic
because the fundamental nature of these sports is to provide revenue
and other ancillary benefits for the university.369
These ignored differences among teams and athletic programs
undermines the argument that the three-part test is a fair and flexible
measure of Title IX compliance. Because any evaluation of Title IX
compliance must permit athletic departments to operate and manage
numerous teams with different organizational structures under
various competitive and funding levels, the three-part test's "one size
fits all" approach to regulating intercollegiate athletics 370 does not
provide athletic departments with sufficient flexibility to achieve
diverse competitive goals.37' To ensure fairness for all institutions, the
enforcement process must account for both the inherent differences
between men's and women's athletic programs, and the diverse
competitive goals and financial considerations.
generated from revenue-producing sports is essential to ensure the expansion of women's
athletic programs).
366. See Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 1974 U.S.C.GC.AN. (88
Stat.) 695 (stating that regulations "shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic
activities' reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports").
367. See Connolly & Adelman, supra note 24, at 846 (stating that OCR ignored the Javitz
Amendment's clear mandate to consider the unique nature of each sport before publishing
regulations pertaining to intercollegiate athletics).
368. See Ferrier, supra note 89, at 875-77 (discussing the "three-sex approach"-excluding
football from the substantial proportionality analysis so as to avoid "the problem created by the
football team").
369. Daniel, supra note 27, at 259.
370. Cf Cantu, supra note 230, at 2-3 (arguing that OCR does not use a "cookie cutter"
approach for regulating intercollegiate athletics).
371. See Daniel, supra note 27, at 258-59 (arguing that Title IX litigation has assumed that all
athletic teams and programs are inherently educational, a view not universally shared).
Specifically, this assumption ignored the presence of athletic programs to provide financial
benefits and recognition upon their host university. Daniel, supra note 27, at 259.
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IV. REPLACING COHEN'sAPPLICATION OF THE THREE-PART TEST WiTH
A SYSTEM THAT WORKS
Title IX is applied in a manner inconsistent with the Act's statutory
language and legislative intent, to the detriment of interested and
able athletes. What is not so clear is how to resolve this inequity.
Ideally, two solutions should be adopted. First, substantial
proportionality, and Cohen's application of the three-part test, should
be abolished as a method of gauging compliance with the statute.
Statistical balancing was never intended by Congress."2 Moreover, no
method of statistical comparison can fairly and equitably account for
all of the differences between men's and women's teams, each sex's
interest and ability to compete, and variations among athletic
programs at hundreds of institutions. 7
Second, compliance mechanisms that allow for the natural
development of athletic interests and abilities of both men and
women should be adopted to replace the three-part test. Current
Title IX enforcement disproportionately focuses upon the outcome
of an athletic program's efforts to comply with the Act. Yet, by
searching for a discriminatory outcome rather than a discriminatory
process, which Title IX is concerned about, the current compliance
mechanisms fail to enforce the Act's intent.374 U.S. intercollegiate
athletic programs have come a long way from 1972, when women
represented only seven percent of intercollegiate athletes."', Today,
institutions provide athletic teams for women in all the major
activities in which they have shown an interest in competing, and
women athletes represent thirty-nine percent of all intercollegiate
athletes.76 Whether women increase their proportional share of
athletic opportunities in the absence of cutting opportunities for
male athletes will, and should, depend on the slow and methodical
formation of interest and ability at the early stages of athletic
development, not affirmative action.
These ideal solutions may never be adopted. Title IX has been
widely misunderstood as a godsend for U.S. women.77 Moreover, any
372. See supra Part IIIA.
373. See supra Part lIT.D.
374. See supra Part ILA.
375. See Schrof, supra note 81, at 52 (noting that the proportion of women participating in
NCAA intercollegiate athletic programs increased to 33% by 1979).
376. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 4.
377. See, Flynn, supra note 13 (reporting that Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, Tim
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member of Congress wishing to legislatively alter current
enforcement mechanisms risks political death by being labeled
"sexist."78 Significant change, in the form of these ideal solutions, is
unlikely to occur until public awareness of Title IX's full effect on
intercollegiate athletics is understood. In the meantime, several
methods or alterations to Title IX's current enforcement mechanism
are available and may help restore equity to the process.
A. Restoring Title IX's Intent: The Wisdom of Pederson
Shortly before the First Circuit ruled in Cohen 11, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana decided another
Title IX case, Pederson v. Louisiana State University (LSU),379 which
rejected Cohen's application of the three-part test.s" Nonetheless, the
court held that LSU violated Title IX. Pederson is an important
rebuttal to Cohen, and an essential addition to Title IX jurisprudence,
because it demonstrates that Title IX can be effectively enforced by a
framework other than Cohen's three-part test.
In Pederson, two classes of women students interested in forming
intercollegiate soccer and softball teams sued for injunctive relief,
alleging that LSU violated Title IX by not providing equal athletic
opportunities for its women students. 2 In reaching her decision,
Judge Rebecca F. Doherty properly held that where plaintiffs attempt
to create a new athletic activity, standing must be satisfied prior to
trial;" 3 the Policy Interpretation was not entitled to judicial deference
in its entirety;3s 4 Cohen's application of the three-part test directly
contradicted the plain text and intent of both the Act and the
controlling regulations;-n and, finally, substantial proportionality was
Russert of NBC's "Meet the Press", and Cokie Roberts of ABC's "Face the Nation" came out in
support of Titie IX following the U.S. Women's Soccer Team's participation in the 1999 World
Cup).
378. See Clarence Page, Bad Call CHi. TRm., July 14, 1999, at 15 (calling Title IX a "'third-
rail' issue" for politicians, causing political death for any who touch it).
379. 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
380. ITd. at 914.
381. Id at 917 (citing LSU's Title IX violations as not "accommodating the interests and
abilities of its female students," and not demonstrating a "history and continuing practice of
expanding athletic opportunities for its female athletes nor an adequate plan to redress its
violations.").
382. Id. at 897-99.
383. Id. at 905-08.
384. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892,914 (M.D. La. 1996).
385. Id.
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an impermissible method for determining compliance under the
Act.ss
6
Finding that LSU provided athletic opportunities for its male
students, the court recognized that LSU must provide equal athletic
opportunity for its female students to comply with Title IX" Prior to
addressing the merits of each class' Title IX claim, Judge Doherty first
separated the claims into their implicit components. The court
stated the key concepts behind the plaintiffs' claims as "exclusion
from participation" because of their sex and "equal athletic
opportunity." s In order to show exclusion, the court stated that a
plaintiff must demonstrate an interest and ability to participate in an
athletic program to meet the exclusion from participation
requirement-"9  In other words, the plaintiff must meet the
preliminary standing requirement.39° The equal athletic opportunity
requirement provides both sexes with the "possibility of
participation" in an athletic program, but does not guarantee
participation. 9 ' Utilizing these concepts, the court held that the
soccer plaintiffs did not satisfy the standing requirement and
dismissed their suit.9 2 The court found that the members of the class
were not personally affected by LSU's failure to field a women's
soccer team because the plaintiffs did not possess the requisite skill to
compete above the club level, and none of the plaintiffs had an
interest in competing in another sport.
3 3
Turning to the softball plaintiffs' claim, the court inquired into the
proper role the Policy Interpretation should play in analyzing Title
IX claims. The court found that the Policy Interpretation was useful
in "identifying issues which arise under Title IX and establishing an
analytical framework" for assessing Title IX claims."4 However, the
Pederson court disagreed with Cohen and its progeny, holding that the
Policy Interpretation only provided "a helpful guide to a thoughtful
analysis of the mandate of Title X.,,s95 While recognizing that the
386. Id
387. Id. at 905.
388. Id.
389. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 905 (M.D. La. 1996).
390. See id. at 905-06 (stating that the question of standing must first be addressed because
the right to bring suit under Title IX is distinct from the right to obtain relief).
391. Id at905.
392. I at907-08.
393. Id,
394. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892,911 (M.D. La. 1996).
395. Id. at 914. The court rejected the "jurisprudential emphasis" on substantial
proportionality and refused to give it "safe harbor" status. Id. The court held that a proper
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Policy Interpretation should play a role in the court's analysis, the
court rejected Cohen's holding that it should be given substantial
deference for two reasons. First, the Policy Interpretation could not
be given binding effect because it was never approved by the
President or Congress.316 To give the Policy Interpretation binding
effect would circumvent § 1682, a unique provision of Tite IX that
requires all rules and regulations enforcing the Act to be signed by
the President before they become effective. "  Second, the Pederson
court found that the Policy Interpretation's provisions were subject to
multiple interpretations, some of which directly contradict the Act's
statutory language.9
Finding that proportionality is not found within the Act or the
implementing regulations, the court held that the idea of
proportionality as a "safe harbor" is not required for Title IX
compliance.99 The court rejected Cohen's reliance upon substantial
proportionality within its application of the three-part test as a "safe
harbor," finding that such an application was precluded by the Quie
amendment codified in § 1681(b)."" Moreover, the court found that
Cohen's underlying assumption that men and women have equal
interests and abilities to compete in intercollegiate athletics on all
campuses to be unsupported.41 Instead of focusing upon substantial
proportionality, the court held that a proper reading of the Policy
Interpretation considers all the factors detailed within it to determine
if an institution has effectively accommodated the athletic interests of
each sex."2
analysis of compliance goes beyond mere proportionality to determine whether the institution
excluded participants based upon their sex. Id,
396. See id. at 910 n.45 (noting that the Policy Interpretation was never submitted to the
President for approval as required by § 1682 of Title IX).
397. Id-
398. Id. at 911-12.
399. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 914 (M.D. La. 1996). While Judge
Doherty rejected proportionality as a stand-alone method for determining Tide IX compliance
or violation, she stated that "percentages should be considered as 'tending to show that such an
imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such
program or activity by the members of the one sex.'" Id
400. Id
401. See id at 913-14 (stating that Cohen's assumption of equal interests and abilities is
unsupported because no evidence was submitted).
402. Id at 914. Just prior to holding that all factors will be considered in determining Title
IX compliance, the court underlined its rejection of the "safe harbor" of substantial
proportionality by writing:
While the safe harbor concept has the virtue of being simplicity itself, this Court will
not join in assuming that athletic directors in this country are incapable of meeting
the burden of Title IX and its regulations which incorporates a knowledge regarding
their student body, effective analysis of and meeting student's needs, and filling those
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The court replaced the Cohen analysis with one drawn from the Act,
regulations, and Policy Interpretation. The court held that it would
look to whether [LSU's] policies are discriminatory in language or
effect, whether substantial and unjustified disparities exist within
the program as a whole between opportunities afforded male and
female students, or whether substantial disparities exist in
individual segments between opportunities afforded male and
female students such as to deny equal athletic opportunity.
403
Following this broad statement of its analysis, the court stated that
the primary focus for determining compliance would be upon LSU's
efforts to meet each sex's interests and abilities. 4 Finding that LSU
had made no attempt to gauge the interests and abilities of its
student population, the court held that LSU failed to "effectively
accommodate" the interests and abilities of its female students."' In
addition, the court stated that LSU did not demonstrate a practice of
expanding opportunities in response to the developing interests and
abilities of its female students."6 Consequently, the court found LSU
in violation of Title IX as to the softball plaintiffs. °7
Pederson's analysis of Title IX compliance is significant for three
reasons. First, while courts may examine each sex's proportion
among an institution's intercollegiate athletes, the court properly
rejected substantial proportionality as a "safe harbor" in analyzing
Title IX compliance. Second, by deviating from the Cohen analysis of
Title IX compliance under the three-part test, the court elevated the
usefulness of the other two prongs of the three-part test. No longer
dependent upon substantial proportionality to define their
application, both prongs now provide institutions with additional
viable methods by which they may satisfy Title IX. Finally, the court
disregarded Cohen's interpretation of the third prong requiring full
accommodation of the interests of female students in the absence of
substantial proportionality 0 8 Instead, Pederson only analyzes the
effective accommodation of the interests of each sex. By reading "the
'full' out of...'full and effective"' accommodation, 9 Pederson
needs in a nondiscriminatory fashion.
403. i at 914-15.
404. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 915 (M.D. La. 1996).
405. Id. at915-16.
406. Id. at916-17.
407. Id. at 917-18.
408. See it. at 913-14 (holding that Cohen's substantial proportionality standard lacked
evidence to support its claimed purpose).
409. See Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899 (arguing that Brown's interpretation of the third prong,
344
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provides institutions with much needed flexibility in determining the
activities, and the proportion of athletic opportunities, it offers to
each sex.
While Pederson was not followed by a stampede of cases adopting its
411holding like Cohen was, it appears that the courts are becoming
receptive to its analysis. Recently, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of California followed Pederson in partially
denying California State University at Bakersfield's motion for
summary judgment in a suit brought by a class of male wrestlers
facing the elimination of their athletic program.411  The court
rejected Cohen and its progeny's characterization of substantial
proportionality as a "safe harbor" for institutions wishing to comply
with Title IX.412 The court agreed with Pederson that such a viewpoint
clearly conflicted with the text of the Act and its implementing
regulations. 3 While the outcome of this case has yet to be decided,
the court's treatment of Pederson may signal the judicial embrace of
an alternative to Cohen.
B. Ensuring Flexibility: Meeting Each Sex's Relative Interests and Abilities
One of the many problems with Cohen is that its interpretation of
the third prong eliminates it as a viable method to comply with Title
IX 1 4 Under Cohen, institutions must fully meet the athletic interests
of their female students, provided that a viable team can be formed,
until substantial proportionality is met.415 In Cohen H, Brown argued
that the third prong is satisfied "when (1) the interests and abilities of
members of the proportionately underrepresented gender (2) are
accommodated to the same degree as the proportionately over
represented gender."41  Brown's "relative interests" approach to the
third prong was rejected by the appellate court for "[reading] the
which is embodied in Pderson, ignores important language within the Policy Interpretation).
410. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994)
(demonstrating a successful argument by twelve female student athletes that there was a failure
to support equal athletic opportunity because there was a failure to field female fast-pitch
softball).
411. Neal v. Board of Trustees of the Cal. State Univ., No. 97-5009, at 31-32 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
26, 1997) (order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for summary
judgment).
412. 1& at 29-32.
413. 1& at 28.
414. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 183 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that "prong three
is not implicated unless a gender-based disparity with respect to athletics participation
opportunities has been shown to exist").
415. Id. at 194 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
416. Id
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'full' out of the duty to accommodate 'fully and effectively"' the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented gender.417 However,
further analysis shows that the "relative interests" approach is the
correct interpretation of the third prong.
In his dissent, Chief Judge Torruella argued that the meaning of
"full" in the third prong is subject to more than one reasonable
interpretation.1 8 While "full" may mean every athletic interest in an
absolute sense, as the First Circuit held, it may also reasonably mean
that the institution must meet the interests and abilities of female
students "as fully as it meets those" of male students.41 ' This latter
interpretation is the crux of the relative interests approach. The
dissent cited the Policy Interpretation's opening statement that "the
governing principle in [intercollegiate athletics] is that the interests
and abilities of male and female students be equally and effectively
accommodated."420 The majority's opinion, the dissent argued, went
beyond this requirement, requiring that the athletic interests of
female students be fully and absolutely met.4 1 Moreover, application
of the majority's opinion contradicted the explicit text of § 1681 (b).
If an institution met the relative interests of one sex to a greater
degree than it met the relative interests of the other, it would violate
§ 1681 (b)'s proscription against preferential or disparate treatment. 2
The dissent stated that these problems with the majority's application
of the accommodation of interests prong argued against its validity as
a reasonable interpretation.42 ' Finally, the dissent chided the majority
for adopting the lower court's interpretation of the third prong
without "review[ing] the district court's reading de novo. 2 4
Adopting the relative interests approach to the third prong
breathes new life into a much unused test for Title IX compliance.
Examination of each sex's relative interest provides flexibility to
institutions where each sex's proportion of interested and able
athletes does not directly correspond to that sex's proportion among
417. 1& at 174 (quoting Cohen , 991 F.2d 888, 899 (Ist Cir. 1993)).
418. Id at 194 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
419. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 194 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
420. Id. at 194 (Torruella, CJ., dissenting).
421. I (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413-14 (1979)).
422. Id. at 194-95.
423. See i&t at 195 (calling the court's interpretation of the third prong "troublesome").
424. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 195 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, CJ., dissenting)
(arguing against the court's deference to the interpretation of the third prong where the
interpretation was made by the district court and not the agency). ChiefJudge Torruella stated
that proper review of the interpretation should be made de novo because it was reviewing the
interpretation of the district court, not the agency. Id.
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the institution's student body. Moreover, it provides institutions with
a stopping point in their expansion of athletic opportunities beyond
substantial proportionality and the inability to field a viable athletic
team.
C. Acknowledging Dfferences Among Teams and Programs
Whether or not the three-part test is ultimately rejected, Title IX
must provide special consideration for the unique characteristics of
the activities it regulates. For example, revenue-producing sports,
contact sports offered for only one sex, and activities with abnormally
large squad sizes must be specially considered when examining Title
IX compliance. Currently, Title IX enforcement does not distinguish
between the economic nature of revenue-producing sports and the
educational nature of other sports,42 nor does it address the proper
method for comparing athletic opportunities where sports may be
offered for only one sex or where an activity has a disproportionate
number of participants.426  The absence of consideration for these
factors contributes to the inequity of substantial proportionality.
Yet, these inequities can be resolved by looking to unused portions
of Title IX's regulations and the Javitz Amendment. For example,
one commentator has argued that the large squad size of football
teams contributes to Title IX's unintended consequences by
providing a disproportionate number of athletic opportunities for
male athletes.47 By incorporating both the Javitz Amendment and
the contact sports exception, this problem can be minimized, if not
eliminated. As Chief Justice Torruella suggested in his dissent in
Cohen 1, contact sports should be excluded from substantial
proportionality's calculation because an institution may permissively
limit participation in these sports to one sex.428 If the number of
participants engaging in contact sports was ignored by substantial
proportionality analysis, the disproportionate effect that football's
large squad size places on current Title IX enforcement would be
425. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 949-50, 975 (stating that the "courts and implementing
agencies have strayed from the legislation that gave them their original authority" and that the
Javitz Amendment was meant to apply to intercollegiate and revenue-producing sports).
426. See Janet Judge, David O'Brien, & Timothy O'Brien, Gender Equity in the 1990s: An
Athletic Administrator's Survival Guide to Title IX and Gender Equity Compliance; SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 313, 321 (1995) (stating that single sex sports and inequities in gender participants in
sport are not ameliorated by Title IX and that Title IX violations are infrequent).
427. SeeJohn K. Wilson, Female Athletes, CHI. TRIB.,July 18, 1999, at 16 (identifying football
as the "real villain" in eliminating opportunity for male athletes).
428. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 192-93 (1st Cir. 1996) (Torruella, C.J.,
dissenting).
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reduced.4 2
Revenue-producing sports may be specially treated under Title IX
through either the Javitz Amendment, or a new congressional
amendment similar to the one introduced by Senator Tower.
Because the Javitz Amendment was enacted in place of the Tower
Amendment, but in addition to Congress' previous grant of
regulatory power in § 1682, the Javitz Amendment's provision for
special consideration for the unique nature of activities includes
special consideration of revenue-producing sports."' Furthermore,
by providing special consideration for revenue-producing sports that
are entirely self-sufficient, financial responsibility will be encouraged.
Institutions will, in turn, preserve more athletic program capital for
the formation or expansion of other athletic teams and
opportunities."'
D. Title VHi's Qualified Applicant Pool: Brining Common Sense to
Substantial Proportionality
Although Title IX is significantly patterned after Title VII and
other civil rights amendments, the courts have refused to look to
Title VII's case law for jurisprudential guidance." ' However, this
statute may lend appropriate guidance for two reasons. First, Title
VIi's use of a "qualified applicant pool" for statistical analysis of
disparate impact is applicable to substantial proportionality analysis
under Title IX. Second, current enforcement of Title IX mirrors
efforts to prohibit discrimination in employment in Title VII
"disparate impact" cases, where the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a prima fade case of discriminatory intent through statistical
disparity.
429. Contact sports are currently offered for both sexes. For example, men's and women's
basketball are considered contact sports under Title IX's regulations. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)
(1997). These sports would offset each other in the number of participation opportunities
provided because of their similar squad sizes. On the other hand, football, which has no equal
in squad size, would directly lower the number of men counted under substantial
proportionality by more than 90 participants. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 20 (reporting
that the average NCAA football program had 91.3 participants during the 1996-97 academic
year, for those institutions belonging to the same NCAA Division as they had during the 1985-86
academic year).
430. See Mahoney, supra note 22, at 950 (arguing that, because the Javitz Amendment's
grant of authority to regulate athletics was duplicative, Congress intended all sports to be
regulated with the highest degree of care and consideration for their unique nature and
characteristics).
431. See 120 CONG. REc. 15,323 (1974) (statement of Sen. Tower) (arguing that the
expansion of athletic programs and opportunities depends, in part, on the promotion and
maintenance of revenue-producing sports and the funds they generate).
432. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (failing to review any Tite VII case law for
direction in the implementation of civil rights statutes).
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Title IX and its regulatory structure disregard the importance of a
qualified applicant pool in determining sex discrimination.
Substantial proportionality simply examines whether each sex's
proportion within the institution's athletic program is proportionate
to each sex's enrollment in the student body. This requirement
sweeps too broadly by considering all students as interested and
potential intercollegiate athletes. Common sense indicates that not
all students have the interest or the ability to compete in
intercollegiate athletics. It is also unlikely that students who did not
compete in interscholastic sports would then have the interest or
ability to compete intercollegiately.
If the courts adopted Title VII's qualified applicant pool, some of
the problems arising from substantial proportionality's overbroad
applicant pool would be eliminated. Male college students appear to
be more interested and able than their female colleagues to compete
in intercollegiate athletics. More men than women participate in
interscholastic sports and intramural sports in college.433 Thus, a
higher proportion of male intercollegiate athletes would reflect a
higher proportion of male students within the institution's qualified
applicant pool and would not, by itself, be sufficient to find a
violation of the Act.
Title IX jurisprudence should also expose itself to Tide VII
"disparate impact" case law as a resource for determining
discrimination where discriminatory intent cannot be proven
through extrinsic evidence.4m In disparate impact cases arising under
Tide VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. First, the plaintiff
433. See GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that 37% of student athletes in 1995 were
female).
434. At least one court has looked to Title VII for support in deciding a Title IX claim in
intercollegiate athletics. In Roberts, CSU argued that the plaintiffs must prove discriminatory
intent as part of their Title IX claim against the university. Roberts v. Colorado State Blvd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 832 (10th Cir. 1993). CSU based its argument on the fact that Title IX was
modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires proof of discriminatory
intent. It. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, holding that Title VII "is the most
appropriate analogue when defining Title IX's substantive standards, including the question of
whether 'disparate impact' is sufficient to establish discrimination under Title IX." It. Relying
on the Supreme Court's holding that Title VII does not require overt proof of discrimination,
the Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not err in not requiring proof of
discriminatory intent. Id. at 833. However, the Tenth Circuit in Roberts ignored significant Title
VII requirements in reaching its decision. First, although statistical analysis demonstrating a
disparate impact can act as a substitute for discriminatory intent, the level of disparity must be a
statistically significant deviation. Robert D'Augustine, A Loosely Laced Buskin? The Department of
Educa tion's Policy Interpretation for Applying Title IX to Intercollegiate Athletics, 6 SETON HAILLJ. SPORT
L. 469, 489 (1996). Second, the Roberts court ignored the fact that a defendant in a Title VII
claim has the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's prima fade case of discrimination by putting
forth a non-discriminatory reason for the practice that allegedly led to the disparate impact. Itt.
at 486.
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must show that the defendant's facially neutral practice had a
disparate impact on a group.43' At this point, the burden shifts to the
defendant to produce a non-disciminatory reason related to the
opportunity the plaintiff sought.436 The plaintiff may then prevail
only if he can prove that the defendant's reason was a pretext for
discrimination.
By adopting Title Vii's disparate treatment standards, the courts
could provide institutions with a shield against Title IX claims-a
non-discriminatory reason for the institutions' actions. As applied to
the facts in Cohen, the plaintiffs may be able to demonstrate a prima
facie case by showing that Brown's elimination of four of its athletic
teams had a disparate impact on interested female students.
However, Brown University could defend itself from suit by stating
that the women's teams were eliminated due to budget concerns, not
because their participants were women. This would also be
supported by the fact that two men's teams were also eliminated.
Accordingly, Brown could defend itself from suit because the
plaintiffs would not be able to show that its reason for eliminating the
teams was a pretext for discrimination.
V. CONCLUSION
The enforcement of Tide IX does not live up to the Act's goal to
provide each sex with equal educational opportunity. Much of the
blame for this unfortunate result lies squarely with the three-part test
and OCR's and Cohen's application of it. By focusing upon
substantial proportionality instead of the accommodation of each
sex's relative athletic interest, OCR and the courts have abandoned
fairness for efficiency. As Norma Cantu so wisely pointed out, Title
IX cannot be fairly enforced through "cookie-cutter" formulas that
require statistical equality.3 7 Yet, "cookie-cutter" formulas have been
used, and inequities have arisen, most notably with the elimination of
men's non-revenue producing teams, to increase the proportion of
women within athletic programs.
Congress should instruct OCR to eliminate the three-part test and
draft new regulations that consider the unique qualities of
435. See Roberts, 998 F.2d 824, 832 (outlining the burdens of proof in disparate impact
claims).
436. Id.
437. Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary of Civil Rights, to Colleges and
Universities explaining the Education Department's final version of its report, "Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance," at 2 (Jan. 19, 1996).
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intercollegiate athletics. Simply removing substantial proportionality
is not enough. The three-part test, even absent substantial
proportionality, does not accurately or clearly reflect the various goals
of intercollegiate athletics. Drafted in response to a time when few
opportunities existed for female students in intercollegiate athletics,
the three-part test's methods for compliance reflect circumstances
and assumptions that no longer exist. Moreover, the three-part test
acts as a de facto quota system that equates equality with
proportionality.4"
At a minimum, the substantial proportionality prong must be
eliminated. Congress must reaffirm its original intent to prohibit the
courts and OCR from requiring statistical balancing and quotas for
institutions to comply with Title IX. Statistical balancing is not
necessary, was never intended by Congress, and is not helpful in
determining sex discrimination within an institution's athletic
program. Any investigation of discrimination should address only
whether the relative athletic interests and abilities of one sex have
been met to the same extent as those of the other sex. Meaningless
comparisons between the proportion of each sex in an institution's
athletic program and student body add nothing to this evaluation.
Title IX must return to its origins as an anti-discrimination statute.
Congress never intended to promote a statistical balancing of
educational interests among the sexes in the form of admission
quotas to institutions or set-aside programs in educational programs
within the institution. Congress never intended Title IX to allocate
half of all spaces in theatre or literature classes for men, or half of all
spaces in science and math classes for women. Congress merely
intended for students of each sex, free from discrimination, to select
the educational programs in which they wished to participate. Title
IX was never intended to require, or even permit, statistical balancing
in educational programs. Eliminating the three-part test, or at least
substantial proportionality, would help to restore the original, and
non-discriminatory, promise of Title IX.
438. See generallyJennifer Lynn Botelho, Comment, The Cohen Court s'Reading of Title IX: Does
it Really Promote a De Facto Quota Scheme?, 33 NEvENG. L. REv. 743 (1999).
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